Ch. 1. Introduction. I. Explanationism. II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism -- Ch. 2. Acausal Models of Explanation. I. Introduction: The Threat Acausalist Models of Explanation Pose to Contemporary Explanationism. II. A Brief History of Acausal Models of Explanation. III. The Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation -- Ch. 3. Van Fraassen's Arguments against Inference to the Best Explanation. I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism. II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments. III. The Bayesian Peter Objection -- Ch. 4. Van Fraassen's Dutch Books. I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints. II. The Principle of Reflection. III. The Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection. IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning a Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions -- Ch. 5. Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique
Summary
Ganson offers new hope in this work for the defense of scientific realism by undermining powerful anti-realist objections and advocating an abandonment of naturalist and externalist strategies
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references
Notes
Dorit A. Ganson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Oberlin College
Online resource; title from PDF title page (Taylor & Francis, viewed February 24, 2020)
