| Description |
1 online resource (15 pages) : illustrations, color map (digital, PDF file) |
| Summary |
Collecting intelligence about Iran's nuclear program has never been easy, and has been hurt by Iran's spotty cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in recent years, along with Iran's long history of telling less than the whole story about its nuclear work. Iranian officials also have a tendency toward bluster that can contribute to both overestimating and underestimating the program. Solid evidence of efforts to achieve nuclear weapons capability has come from technical surveillance, human penetration, and interception of weapons-related imports, as well as Iran's continued production of ever higher grades of enriched uranium with no obvious near-term civilian use. So far, however, there has been no smoking gun when it comes to Iran's nuclear weapons intentions. The IAEA and the UN Security Council, with the support of their member states, should continue to press for more and better access to Iran's nuclear sites and personnel. Intelligence professionals should maintain high critical standards as they evaluate new information. While seeking negotiations, the U.S. and its allies should stress targeted sanctions, stepped-up interdiction of nuclear and dual-use materials, and sabotage of nuclear-related raw materials, equipment, and computer software in order to inhibit Iran's nuclear weapons potential |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Title from p.1 screen (viewed on September 25, 2011) |
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Mode of access: World Wide Web |
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System requirements: Adobe Reader |
| Subject |
Nuclear nonproliferation -- Iran
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Nuclear weapons -- Iran
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Nuclear arms control -- Iran -- International cooperation
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Nuclear arms control -- International cooperation.
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Nuclear nonproliferation.
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Nuclear weapons.
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Iran.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Atlantic Council of the United States. South Asia Center.
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