| Description |
xiii, 300 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
| Contents |
Contents note continued: iii.Institutions -- iv."Varieties of Capitalism" and Institutional Complementarities -- v.Coalitions -- vi.Political Parties and Political Salience -- vii.Extra-Corporate Stakeholder Protections -- C.Toward a Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World -- 5.Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Social Welfare Policy -- A.The U.K. Model: State-Based Social Welfare Policy -- B.The U.S. Model: Employer-Based Social Welfare Policy -- C.Predominance of the U.K. Social Welfare Model -- i.Australia -- ii.Canada -- D.Shareholder Orientation, Social Welfare, and Political Equilibrium -- pt. III THE THEORY'S EXPLANATORY DOMAIN -- 6.Stability, Change, and the Future of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World -- A.Mapping the Explanatory Domain -- B.The Evolving Shareholder Base -- C.Postcrisis Austerity -- D.Postcrisis Coalitions -- 7.Conclusions |
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Machine generated contents note: pt. I SHAREHOLDER ORIENTATION IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD -- 1.Introduction and Overview -- 2.Comparative Theory and Corporate Governance -- A.Functionalism and Contextualism -- B.Failing Better -- 3.The Corporate Governance Role of Shareholders in Common-Law Jurisdictions -- A.The U.K. Model: Strong Shareholders -- i.Shareholders as Stewards -- ii.Enlightened Shareholder Value -- iii.Contractualism and U.K. Corporate Governance -- B.The U.S. Model: Weak Shareholders -- i.Shareholders as Spectators -- ii.Ambivalence Regarding Shareholder Interests -- iii.Prevailing Theories of U.S. Corporate Governance -- C.Predominance of the U.K. Corporate Governance Model -- i.Australia -- ii.Canada -- D.Shareholder Lawsuits and Corporate Governance -- pt. II A POLITICAL THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD -- 4.Comparative Theories of Corporate Governance -- A.Economics -- B.Politics -- i."Law Matters" -- ii.Social Democracy -- |
| Summary |
"The corporate governance systems of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States are often characterized as a single "Anglo-American" system prioritizing shareholders' interests over those of other corporate stakeholders. Such generalizations, however, obscure substantial differences across the common-law world. Contrary to popular belief, shareholders in the United Kingdom and jurisdictions following its lead are far more powerful and central to the aims of the corporation than are shareholders in the United States. This book presents a new comparative theory to explain this divergence and explores the theory's ramifications for law and public policy. Bruner argues that regulatory structures affecting other stakeholders' interests - notably differing degrees of social welfare protection for employees - have decisively impacted the degree of political opposition to shareholder-centric policies across the common-law world. These dynamics remain powerful forces today, and understanding them will be vital as post-crisis reforms continue to take shape."--pub. desc |
| Notes |
Includes index |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages xi-xiii) and index |
| Subject |
Common law.
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Corporate governance -- Law and legislation.
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Stockholders -- Legal status, laws, etc.
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| LC no. |
2012042747 |
| ISBN |
1107013291 (hbk.) |
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9781107013292 (hbk.) |
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