| Description |
1 online resource (304 pages) |
| Series |
Philosophy of mind series |
|
Philosophy of mind series.
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| Contents |
Preface -- Contents -- 1. Introduction: The Mind, the Computer, and the Alternatives -- 1.1 The Mind as Computer -- 1.2 Alternatives: The Varieties of Situated Cognition -- 1.3 Looking Ahead -- 1.4 Strategy and Methods -- 1.5 The Book�s Conclusions -- Part I: The Thinking Organism -- 2. Principles of Demarcation -- 2.1 The Challenge of Demarcation -- 2.2 Extension-Friendly Principles of Demarcation -- 2.3 The Parity Principle -- 2.4 Conclusion -- 3. Cognitive Systems and Demarcation -- 3.1 The Success of Cognitive Psychology -- 3.2 The Systems-Based View |
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3.3 Two Arguments against the Extended View3.4 Extension-Friendly Rejoinders -- 3.5 The No-Self View -- 4. Realization and Extended Cognition -- 4.1 The Argument from Empirical Success and Methodology, Restated -- 4.2 Extended Cognition and Realization -- 4.3 Functionalism and the Causal Constraint on Realization -- 4.4 The Argument from Causal Interaction -- 4.5 Wide Realization, Total Realization, and Causal Powers -- 4.6 Cleaning Up -- Part II: Arguments for the Extended View -- 5. Functionalism and Natural Kinds -- 5.1 The Functionalist Argument |
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5.2 The Natural-Kinds Argument5.3 The Empirical Response -- 5.4 The Pragmatic Turn -- 6. Developmental Systems Theory and the Scaffolding of Language -- 6.1 Causal Spread and Complementary Role -- 6.2 A Case of Nontrivial Causal Spread: Developmental Systems Theory -- 6.3 The Most Powerful Transformation: Language-Learning -- 7. Dynamical Systems Theory -- 7.1 Dynamical Systems Theory and Cognitive Science -- 7.2 Dynamical Systems and Extended Cognition: General Patterns of Argument -- 7.3 Six Kinds of Dynamical-Systems-Based Model |
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7.4 Evolution, Context-Dependence, and Epistemic Dependence8. The Experience of Extension and the Extension of Experience -- 8.1 Cognitive Science and the In-Key Constraint -- 8.2 The Phenomenology of Smooth Coping -- 8.3 The Sense of One�s Own Location -- 8.4 Control-Based Arguments -- 8.5 Control Simpliciter -- 8.6 Extended Cognition and Extended Experience -- Part III: The Embedded and Embodied Mind -- 9. Embedded Cognition and Computation -- 9.1 The Embedded Approach -- 9.2 Computation, Implementation, and Explicitly Encoded Rules |
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9.3 Computationalism in Principle and Computationalism in Practice9.4 Timing, Computationalism, and Dynamical Systems Theory -- 9.5 Conclusion -- 10. Embedded Cognition and Mental Representation -- 10.1 What Is Special about Embedded Representations? -- 10.2 Atomic Affordance Representations -- 10.3 Embedded Models and External Content -- 10.4 Innate Representations and the Inflexibility Objection -- 10.5 Conclusion -- 11. The Embodied View -- 11.1 Preliminaries: Where the Disagreement Is Not -- 11.2 The Constraint Thesis -- 11.3 The Content Thesis |
| Summary |
Robert Rupert argues against the view that human cognitive processes comprise elements beyond the boundary of the organism, developing a systems-based conception in place of this extended view |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Cognition.
|
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Cognitive science.
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Cognition
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Theory of Mind
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Cognitive Science
|
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cognition.
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Cognition
|
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Cognitive science
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
0195379454 |
|
9780195379457 |
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0199702144 |
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9780199702145 |
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9780199869114 |
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0199869111 |
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