| Description |
xxxvii, 563 pages ; 25 cm |
| Contents |
Contents note continued: 10.5.2.2.Specific offences for breaches of duties -- 10.6.Conclusion -- 11.Corporate governance in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa -- 11.1.Introduction -- 11.2.United States -- 11.2.1.Background to the corporate governance debate in the United States -- 11.2.2.The American Law Institute's involvement in the corporate governance debate -- 11.2.2.1.Basic aims of the project -- 11.2.2.2.Impact and importance of the project -- 11.2.2.3.Some of the key aspects addressed -- 11.2.3.The Securities Exchange Commission -- 11.2.4.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 - the US response to collapses such as Enron and WorldCom -- 11.2.4.1.Backdrop -- 11.2.4.2.Aims and objectives -- 11.2.4.3.Some perspectives on SOX and its effect -- 11.2.5.NYSE: Sections 303 and 303A - corporate governance rules -- 11.2.5.1.Background -- 11.2.5.2.Summary of the most important NYSE corporate governance rules -- |
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Contents note continued: 11.2.6.The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act) -- 11.3.United Kingdom (with contributions by Jeanne Nel de Koker) -- 11.3.1.Background to the corporate governance debate in the United Kingdom -- 11.3.2.The Cadbury Report and the unfolding of the concept of 'corporate governance' in the United Kingdom -- 11.3.2.1.Context of the Cadbury Report -- 11.3.2.2.Code of best practice -- 11.3.2.3.Further developments -- 11.3.3.The UK approach to corporate governance -- 11.3.4.The 2008 UK Combined Code and the 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code -- 11.3.5.The Stewardship Code -- 11.3.6.Corporate Governance Code for SMEs -- 11.4.Canada -- 11.4.1.Overview -- 11.4.2.Regulatory environment -- 11.4.3.Proposed National Policy 58-201: Corporate Governance Principles -- 11.4.4.Current National Policy 58-201: Corporate Governance Guidelines -- 11.4.5.National Instrument 58-101: Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices -- |
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Contents note continued: 11.4.6.National Instrument 52-110 and Companion Policy 52-110CP: Audit Committees -- 11.4.7.Future direction -- 11.5.South Africa -- 11.5.1.Introduction / Irene-marié Esser -- 11.5.2.The King Report (2009) / Irene-marié Esser -- 11.5.3.The Companies Act 71 of 2008 / Irene-marié Esser -- 11.5.4.Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and South African company law / Irene-marié Esser -- 11.5.5.Shareholder activism: CRISA / Irene-marié Esser -- 11.5.6.Conclusions on South Africa / Irene-marié Esser -- 11.6.Conclusion / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.Corporate governance in the EU, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, and corporate governance in Germany, Japan, China and Indonesia / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.1.Introduction / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.2.European Union (EU) / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.2.1.Enhancing corporate governance / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.2.2.Reflections / Irene-marié Esser -- |
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Contents note continued: 12.2.3.European Corporate Governance Forum (ECGF) / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.2.4.European Corporate Governance Codes Network / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.2.5.The EU single market / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.2.6.Future priorities / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.3.OECD Principles of Corporate Governance / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.3.1.Background / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.3.2.Broad aims and application / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.3.3.Structure / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.3.4.Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.3.5.Disclosure and transparency / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.3.6.Conclusions on OECD corporate governance principles / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.4.Germany / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.4.1.Background to the corporate governance debate in Germany / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.4.2.The German Corporate Governance Code / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.4.2.1.Background to its adoption / Irene-marié Esser -- |
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Contents note continued: 12.4.2.2.Structure and explanatory nature of the German Code / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.4.3.Employee participation at supervisory board level - codetermination / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.4.4.The German board structure / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.4.5.Conclusions on Germany / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.5.Japan / Irene-marié Esser -- 12.5.1.Introduction / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.2.Historical transformations in Japanese corporate law and practice / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.3.Japanese corporate forms and internal governance mechanisms / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.3.1.Overview / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.3.2.The board of directors and choice in governance structures / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.3.3.Directors' duties and derivative actions / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.4.Shareholder versus bank finance / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- |
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Contents note continued: 12.5.4.1.Overview / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.4.2.Takeovers regulation / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.4.3.New firms in the IPO market / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.4.4.Main banks / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.5.Core employees / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.5.6.Conclusions on Japan / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.6.China / Souichirou Kozuka / Luke Nottage -- 12.6.1.Introduction / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.2.Government and legislation in China / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.3.Corporate entities in China / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.3.1.State-owned enterprises / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.3.2.Foreign investment enterprises / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.3.3.The private sector and companies under the Company Law / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.4.Corporate governance - issues and resolutions / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.5.Controlling the board of directors and the managers - the supervisory board / Vivienne Bath -- |
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Contents note continued: 12.6.6.Increasing the duties of directors / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.7.Independent directors / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.8.Committees / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.9.Controlling shareholders and protection for minority shareholders under the Company Law / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.10.Disclosure requirements / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.11.Imposing additional requirements on the sponsors of public offerings / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.12.Higher standards of accounting and internal control - Basic Norms for Internal Control of Enterprises / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.13.Direct intervention - the case of dividends / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.14.Enforcement / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.15.Consequences of breach / Vivienne Bath -- 12.6.16.Conclusions on China / Vivienne Bath -- 12.7.Indonesia / Vivienne Bath -- 12.7.1.Introduction / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.2.The national code of corporate governance / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.3.The Indonesian two-tier board model / Miko Kamal -- |
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Contents note continued: 12.7.3.1.The general meeting of shareholders (GMS) / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.3.2.The dtreksi / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.3.3.The dewan komisaris (board of commissioners) / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.4.Corporate governance 'champions' in Indonesia / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.4.1.Banking companies / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.4.2.State-owned enterprises / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.4.3.Insurance companies / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.5.Some core features of the Indonesian corporate governance model / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.5.1.Independent commissioner/s / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.5.2.The supporting committees of the dewan komisaris / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.5.3.Internal and external auditors / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.5.4.Risk management / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.5.5.Business ethics and anti-corruption / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.5.6.Sharia supervisory board / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.5.7.Some additional requirements for members of direksis / Miko Kamal -- 12.7.6.Conclusion on Indonesia / Miko Kamal -- 12.8.Conclusion / Miko Kamal -- |
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Contents note continued: 13.Shareholder activism / Miko Kamal -- 13.1.Introduction / Miko Kamal -- 13.2.What is shareholder activism? / Miko Kamal -- 13.3.What attracts shareholder activism? / Miko Kamal -- 13.4.Does shareholder activism add value? / Miko Kamal -- 13.5.Characteristics of shareholder activism / Miko Kamal -- 13.6.Internal activism / Miko Kamal -- 13.6.1.Overview / Miko Kamal -- 13.6.2.Obtaining information / Miko Kamal -- 13.6.3.Convening members' meetings / Miko Kamal -- 13.6.4.Distributing information to members / Miko Kamal -- 13.6.5.Voting at a members' meeting / Miko Kamal -- 13.7.Court action / Miko Kamal -- 13.7.1.Individual actions / Miko Kamal -- 13.7.2.Class actions / Miko Kamal -- 13.8.Case studies / Miko Kamal -- 13.9.Conclusion / Miko Kamal -- 14.The ethical obligations of corporations / Miko Kamal -- 14.1.Introduction - the nature of morality / Miko Kamal -- |
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Contents note continued: 14.2.The threshold issue: Is there a role for ethical considerations in business? / Miko Kamal -- 14.2.1.A brief look at the short history of business ethics / Miko Kamal -- 14.2.2.The disunity between business and ethics argument / Miko Kamal -- 14.2.3.Morality applies to business because moral judgments are universalisable / Miko Kamal -- 14.2.4.Are moral norms too vague to apply to business? / Miko Kamal -- 14.2.5.Summary of the general link between business and ethics / Miko Kamal -- 14.3.Application of moral principles to a business setting / Miko Kamal -- 14.4.Conclusion / Miko Kamal |
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Contents note continued: 2.2.2.8.All stakeholders have vested interests in the sustainability of corporations -- 2.3.Stakeholders' interests and the corporation: The role of the law -- 2.3.1.The Australian position -- 2.3.2.Overseas position: A snapshot -- 2.3.2.1.OECD -- 2.3.2.2.European Union (EU) -- 2.3.2.3.United States -- 2.3.2.4.United Kingdom -- 2.3.2.5.Canada -- 2.3.2.6.South Africa -- 2.4.Stakeholder interests, good governance and the interests of the corporation: A mutual relationship -- 2.4.1.General analysis -- 2.4.2.Case study of James Hardie's asbestos compensation settlement -- 2.4.2.1.Impetus for corporate restructure -- 2.4.2.2.Key features of the separation plan -- 2.4.2.3.Public announcement of the separation -- 2.4.2.4.Scheme of arrangement and relocation to The Netherlands -- 2.4.2.5.Jackson Report and its significance -- 2.4.2.6.Aftermath -- 2.5.CSR and directors' duties -- 2.6.Conclusion -- |
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Contents note continued: 3.Board functions and structures (with contributions by Jeanne Nel de Koker) -- 3.1.Higher community expectation of directors -- 3.1.1.Initially low standards of care, skill and diligence expected of directors -- 3.1.2.Legal recognition of changed community expectation of directors -- 3.2.The organs of governance -- 3.3.Board functions -- 3.4.Board structures -- 3.5.Board structures in the broader context of a good corporate governance model -- 3.5.1.Overview -- 3.5.2.Effective board structure -- 3.5.3.Effective support mechanisms to assist the board in properly fulfilling its functions -- 3.5.4.Effective statutory provisions -- 3.5.5.Effective regulators -- 3.5.6.Effective codes of best practice and conduct -- 3.5.7.Corporate governance rating systems for companies -- 3.6.Conclusion -- 4.Types of company directors and officers (with contributions by Jeanne Nel de Koker) -- 4.1.Overview -- 4.2.Definition of 'director' -- |
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Contents note continued: 4.2.1.De jure and de facto directors covered -- 4.2.2.Shadow director -- 4.2.3.Nominee directors -- 4.3.Definition of 'officer' -- 4.3.1.Statutory definition -- 4.3.2.Senior employees and senior executives as 'officers' -- 4.3.3.Middle management as 'officers'? -- 4.4.Types of company officers -- 4.4.1.Executive and non-executive directors -- 4.4.2.Independent non-executive directors -- 4.4.3.Connected non-executive directors -- 4.4.4.Lead independent directors or senior independent directors -- 4.4.5.The managing director, managing directors, the chief executive officer (CEO), executive directors and senior executives -- 4.4.6.Chairperson -- 4.4.7.Alternate director -- 4.4.8.Secretary -- 4.5.Training and induction of directors -- 4.5.1.Training -- 4.5.2.Induction of new directors -- 4.6.Ethical behaviour by directors -- 4.7.Remuneration of directors and executives -- 4.7.1.A controversial and politically sensitive issue -- |
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Contents note continued: 4.7.2.Disclosure of remuneration and emoluments in Australia -- 4.7.3.Some provisions of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations dealing with remuneration -- 4.7.4.Further measures to counter excessive directors' and executives' remuneration -- 4.8.Board diversity -- 4.8.1.Another controversial and politically sensitive issue -- 4.8.2.Gender diversity and quota legislation -- 4.8.3.Quota legislation -- 4.8.4.Significant recent developments regarding gender quotas at the European Union (EU) level -- 4.8.5.Future impact of women in the corporate world -- 4.9.Conclusion -- 5.Regulation of corporate governance -- 5.1.Overview -- 5.2.Regulation generally -- 5.3.Objectives in regulating corporate governance -- 5.4.Sources of regulation in Australia -- 5.4.1.'Hard law' -- 5.4.1.1.Statutory regulation - corporate law -- 5.4.1.2.Statutory regulation - other than corporate law -- |
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Contents note continued: 5.4.1.3.'Corporate governance and the judges' - the place of judge-made law -- 5.4.2.'Hybrids' -- 5.4.2.1.ASX Listing Rules -- 5.4.2.2.ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations -- 5.4.2.3.Accounting standards -- 5.4.2.4.Auditing standards -- 5.4.3.'Soft law' -- 5.4.4.The role of market forces -- 5.5.Towards an effective supervision of financial markets regulatory framework in Australia - analysis -- 5.5.1.OECD's guidelines for achieving an effective governance framework -- 5.5.2.Division of responsibilities between the ASX and ASIC -- 5.6.Conclusion -- 6.The role of the regulators: ASIC and the ASX -- 6.1.Introduction -- 6.2.The Australian Securities and Investments Commission -- 6.2.1.Overview -- 6.2.2.Statutory powers under the ASIC Act -- 6.2.3.The role of ASIC in corporate governance -- 6.2.4.ASIC enforcement patterns -- 6.3.The Australian Securities Exchange Ltd -- 6.3.1.Slow to get out of the blocks -- |
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Contents note continued: 6.3.2.Rapid change in attitude since the end of 2002 -- 6.3.3.ASX Corporate Governance Council's Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations -- 6.3.3.1.Changes -- 6.3.3.2.Structure -- 6.3.3.3.Recommendations -- 6.3.3.4.The roles of and relationship between the ASX and ASIC -- 6.4.Conclusion -- 7.Accounting governance -- 7.1.Overview -- 7.2.Background to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program and some later developments -- 7.3.The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program -- 7.4.Impetus for CLERP 9: Responding to corporate collapses -- 7.5.Explanation of key CLERP 9 reforms -- 7.5.1.Audit reform -- 7.5.2.Corporate disclosure -- 7.5.2.1.Remuneration of directors and executives -- 7.5.2.2.Financial reporting -- 7.5.2.3.Continuous disclosure -- 7.5.2.4.Shareholder participation -- 7.5.2.5.Whistleblowers -- 7.5.3.Miscellaneous reforms -- 7.5.3.1.Officers, senior managers and employees -- 7.5.3.2.Enforcement -- 7.5.3.3.Proportionate liability -- |
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Contents note continued: 7.6.Accounting standards -- 7.7.Conclusion -- 8.Auditors and audits (with contributions by Christine Jubb) -- 8.1.Introduction: The audit role and where it fits into corporate governance -- 8.1.1.Overview of the audit role -- 8.1.2.The link between the audit role and corporate governance -- 8.2.CLERP 9 changes to audit role -- 8.3.Auditor independence -- 8.3.1.Overview of rationale behind independence requirement -- 8.3.2.General requirement for auditor independence -- 8.3.3.Meaning of 'conflict of interest situation' -- 8.3.4.Disclosing and resolving conflicts -- 8.3.5.Specific independence requirements - minimising conflict of interest through employment and financial restrictions -- 8.3.6.Auditor rotation -- 8.3.7.Disclosure of non-audit services -- 8.4.Auditors and the AGM -- 8.5.Auditors' duties -- 8.6.Reducing the legal exposure of auditors -- 8.6.1.Overview of auditors' liability -- 8.6.2.Registration of audit companies -- |
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Contents note continued: 8.6.3.Proportionate liability -- 8.7.Qualification of auditors -- 8.8.Uniform auditing standards -- 8.9.Audit oversight -- 8.10.Audit committees -- 8.11.Conclusion -- 9.Directors' duties and liability -- 9.1.Introduction -- 9.2.Part 9.4B: Civil penalty provisions or pecuniary penalty provisions -- 9.2.1.Overview -- 9.2.2.The civil penalty provisions -- 9.2.2.1.Section 180: Duty of care and diligence - civil obligation -- 9.2.2.2.Section 181: Duty of good faith - civil obligation -- 9.2.2.3.Sections 182 and 183: Duty not to use position or information to gain personally or cause detriment to the corporation -- 9.2.2.4.Part 2E: Duty relating to related party transactions -- 9.2.2.5.Part 2H: Duty relating to share capital transactions -- 9.2.2.6.Parts 2M.2 and 2M.3: Duty relating to requirements for financial reports -- 9.2.2.7.Part 5.7B: Duty to prevent insolvent trading -- 9.2.2.8.Part 5C: Duties relating to managed investment schemes -- |
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Contents note continued: 9.2.2.9.Chapter 6CA: Duty relating to continuous disclosure -- 9.2.2.10.Part 7.10: Duty not to be involved in market misconduct and other prohibited conduct relating to financial products and financial services -- 9.2.2.11.Subclause 29(6) of Schedule 4: Duty relating to disclosure for proposed demutualisation -- 9.2.2.12.Relief from civil liability -- 9.3.Case studies regarding civil penalty provisions or pecuniary penalty provisions -- 9.3.1.Overview -- 9.3.2.ASIC v Adler [2002] 41 ACSR 72 -- 9.3.2.1.Summary of the facts -- 9.3.2.2.Contraventions of civil penalty provisions -- 9.3.2.3.Court orders -- 9.3.3.ASIC v Macdonald (No. 11) (2009) 256 ALR 199 - James Hardie litigation -- 9.3.3.1.Background and summary of the facts -- 9.3.3.2.Legal issues -- 9.3.3.3.Judicial decisions and the significance of the litigation -- 9.3.3.4.Court orders -- 9.3.4.ASIC v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229 -- 9.3.4.1.Background and basic facts -- 9.3.4.2.Legal issue -- |
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Contents note continued: 9.3.4.3.The decision and its significance -- 9.4.Conclusion -- 10.Enforcement of directors' duties -- 10.1.Introduction -- 10.2.The statutory derivative action: Part 2F.1A -- 10.2.1.The case to introduce a statutory derivative action -- 10.2.2.Eligible applicant -- 10.2.3.Cause of action -- 10.2.4.Leave of court required to institute the statutory derivative action -- 10.3.Oppressive conduct of affairs: Part 2F.1 -- 10.3.1.Type of conduct covered by Part 2F.1 -- 10.3.2.Who may apply for relief under Part 2F.1? -- 10.3.3.Nature of relief available under Part 2F.1 -- 10.4.Section 1324 injunctions -- 10.4.1.Introduction -- 10.4.2.Section 1324(1) -- 10.4.3.The court's discretion -- 10.4.4.Remedies in particular -- 10.5.Criminal liability of directors -- 10.5.1.The importance of the criminal sanction in the corporations law -- 10.5.2.Selected criminal offences directors and other officers can commit under the Corporations Act -- 10.5.2.1.General -- |
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Machine generated contents note: 1.The concept 'corporate governance' and 'essential' principles of corporate governance (with contributions by Jeanne Nel de Koker) -- 1.1.The meaning of corporate governance -- 1.1.1.Generally -- 1.1.2.Origins of the corporate governance debate and some corporate governance and corporate law theories -- 1.1.3.Proposed definition of 'corporate governance' -- 1.2.'Essential' principles of corporate governance -- 1.3.Is 'good corporate governance' important and does it add value? -- 1.4.Are corporate governance models converging? -- 1.5.Conclusion -- 2.Stakeholders in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility -- 2.1.Introduction -- 2.2.Stakeholders in the corporation: An overview -- 2.2.1.What is a stakeholder? -- 2.2.2.Discussion of different stakeholders -- 2.2.2.1.Shareholders -- 2.2.2.2.Employees -- 2.2.2.3.Creditors -- 2.2.2.4.Customers -- 2.2.2.5.The community -- 2.2.2.6.The environment -- 2.2.2.7.Government -- |
| Summary |
Offers comprehensive coverage of the key topics and emerging themes in corporate governance in the private sector. It explains both the principles of corporate governance systems and their real-world application in an authoritative and engaging manner |
| Analysis |
Australian |
| Notes |
Record machine-generated from publisher information |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
Comparative law.
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Corporate governance -- Law and legislation -- Australia.
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Corporate governance -- Law and legislation.
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Corporate governance -- Australia.
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Corporate governance.
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Directors of corporations -- Australia.
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Directors of corporations.
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| Author |
Bagaric, Mirko, author
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Bath, Vivienne, contributor
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Hargovan, Anil, 1962- author
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Harris, Jason, 1975- author
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| LC no. |
2015372275 |
| ISBN |
1107432421 (paperback) |
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9781107432420 |
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(electronic bk.) |
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(electronic bk.) |
