| Description |
1 online resource (28 pages) : illustrations |
| Series |
IMF working paper ; WP/02/73 |
|
IMF working paper ; WP/02/73.
|
| Summary |
Annotation Understanding of the domestic political environment is key to building broad country ownership and the successful implementation of reform programs supported by international financial institutions (IFIs). But recipient countries are not unitary actors: policymakers are influenced by special interest groups (SIGs) opposing reforms, leading to distorted policies. Using a new model of the financial relations between a benevolent IFI and a sovereign borrower subject to influence by SIGs, we analyze the determinants and welfare impacts of conditional and unconditional assistance. While conditionality may raise IFI welfare, economize on the amount of assistance, and lower domestic distortions, it may not always raise recipient country welfare. Recipient governments are always better off if assistance is provided unconditionally |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-28) |
| Notes |
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL |
|
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL |
|
Print version record |
| Subject |
International Monetary Fund.
|
| SUBJECT |
International Monetary Fund fast |
| Subject |
Financial institutions, International -- Econometric models
|
|
Conditionality (International relations) -- Econometric models
|
|
Loans, Foreign -- Econometric models
|
|
Economic assistance -- Econometric models
|
|
Economic assistance -- Econometric models
|
|
Loans, Foreign -- Econometric models
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Mourmouras, Alex
|
|
International Monetary Fund. Policy Development and Review Department.
|
| ISBN |
1451895925 |
|
9781451895926 |
|
128126377X |
|
9781281263773 |
|
