Description |
xi, 233 pages ; 24 cm |
Series |
Routledge studies in ethics and moral theory ; 6 |
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Routledge studies in ethics and moral theory ; 6
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Contents |
Introduction: scepticism about moral responsibility (SMR) -- Determinism and alternative possibilities (SMR's premises A and B) -- Determinism (SMR's premise A) -- Does determinism preclude alternative possibilities? -- Alternative possibilities : conditional analyses -- The consequence argument and rule beta -- Defending incompatibilism -- Incompatibilism without transfer -- Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility (SMR's premise B) -- Frankfurt cases -- "Self-trapping cases -- "Luther" cases -- Moral responsibility and control (SMR's premise B) -- Ultimate control and determinism -- Classical compatibilism : actions, desires and the self -- Frankfurt's view of freedom of the will -- Frankfurt's view of moral responsibility -- Value-based accounts of control : Watson, Wolf -- Reasons-responsiveness and ownership : Fischer and Ravizza -- Indeterminism and moral responsibility (SMR's premise C) -- Alternative possibilities, ultimate control and indeterminism -- Kane's conception of free will -- Difficulties for Kane's libertarianism -- Overcoming scepticism : belief and moral responsibility -- Scepticism : diagnosis and outline of an anti-sceptical proposal -- Belief, control and responsibility -- Evaluative beliefs and moral responsibility -- Evaluative beliefs and alternative possibilities -- Indeterminism, belief and moral responsibility |
Summary |
"This book lays out the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility and subjects them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis. Moral Responsibility lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. The book goes on to suggest a way in which scepticism can be avoided, arguing that an excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at the root of scepticism of moral responsibility. Carlos Moya offers an alternative to scepticism, showing how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility which stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility."--BOOK JACKET |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages [225]-228) and index |
Subject |
Responsibility.
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Free will and determinism.
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Social ethics.
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Skepticism.
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LC no. |
2005011704 |
ISBN |
9780415371957 hardback |
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0415371953 hardback |
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