Ch. 1. Cognitive Science Is Not Cognitive Psychology -- Ch. 2. The Dilemma of Mental Causality. -- Mental States as Higher Level Properties. -- Privileged Regularities and Ceteris Paribus Clauses. -- Screening off Causes. -- Ignoring the Realism/Antirealism Debate -- Ch. 3. Hierarchies in the Brain. -- The Neuron. -- The Methodological Individualism/Anti-Individualism Debate. -- Hierarchies in Neuroscience. -- "Privileged" Causality in Neuroscience. -- Explanation in Cognitive Science -- Ch. 4. Computationalism and Functional Analysis: A Pragmatic Approach. -- Formal Accounts of Computationalism. -- Computational Satisfaction and True Computation. -- Functionalism and Functional Analysis. -- Philosophical Functionalism. -- An Example. -- The Function/Structure Distinction -- Ch. 5. Reductionism in the Cognitive Sciences. -- Reductionism in Philosophy of Mind. -- Arguments against Reductionism. -- Cognitive Theories of Emotion: A Test Case. -- Explanatory Extension
Summary
How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science specifies the characteristics of fruitful interdisciplinary theories in cognitive science and shows how they differ from the successful theories in the individual disciplines composing the cognitive sciences. It articulates a method for integrating the various disciplines successfully so that unified, truly interdisciplinary theories are possible. This book makes three contributions of utmost importance. First, it provides a long-overdue, systematic examination of the field of cognitive science itself. Second, it provides a template for linking domains without loss of autonomy. This philosophical treatment of integration serves as a blueprint for future endeavors. Third, the book provides a solid theoretical foundation that will prevent future missteps and enhance collaboration
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 205-240) and index
