Table of Contents |
1. | Political Identity, Perfectionism, and Neutrality | 1 |
| Introduction | 1 |
| Perfectionism, Neutrality, and the Aims of Government | 4 |
| Personal Identity and Political Identity | 10 |
| Overview of the Structure of the Book | 11 |
| References | 13 |
2. | Personal Identity and Liberal Political Theory | 15 |
| Introduction to Communitarian Objections to Liberal Political Theory | 15 |
| Liberal Theory and Individualism | 19 |
| Metaphysical Individualism | 20 |
| Normative Individualism | 21 |
| Liberals, Communitarians, and Individualism | 21 |
| Communitarian Objections to Rawls | 28 |
| Objections to the Original Position | 28 |
| Objections to the Political Conception of the Person | 31 |
| Priority of the Right and Objections to the Political Conception of the Person | 34 |
| References | 36 |
3. | Clarification of the Liberal/Communitarian Debate and Metaphysical Objections to Rawls's Conception of the Person | 39 |
| Taylor on the Liberal/Communitarian Debate | 39 |
| Priority of the Right over the Good and Unencumbered Selves | 43 |
| Objections to Normative Individualism | 50 |
| Conclusion | 55 |
| References | 56 |
4. | Taylor's Conception of Persons and His Theory of Personal Identity | 57 |
| Introduction | 57 |
| Taylor's Objection to Atomistic Conceptions of Persons | 58 |
| Taylor's Conception of Persons | 63 |
| Taylor on Language and Persons' Identities | 66 |
| Frameworks and Strong Evaluation | 69 |
| Taylor's Conception of Personal Identity | 72 |
| Conclusion | 78 |
| References | 78 |
5. | Defense of the Original Position | 81 |
| Two Purposes of the Original Position | 81 |
| Intermediate Goal: Support for C | 82 |
| Ultimate Goal: Connecting C with Justice | 83 |
| Argument Interpretation of the Original Position | 85 |
| Evidence in Favor of the Argument Interpretation | 86 |
| Argument Interpretation | 87 |
| Translation of the Conditions of the Original Position | 88 |
| Sample Argument | 92 |
| Two Possible Objections to the Argument Interpretation and Responses | 93 |
| Refutation of the Objections to the Original Position | 94 |
| Identity Objection | 95 |
| Personhood Objection | 96 |
| From Metaphysical to Normative Identity | 98 |
| References | 102 |
6. | Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of Persons | 103 |
| Metaphysical Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person | 104 |
| Normative Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person | 111 |
| Objection on the Grounds of Valuing the Capacity for Choice | 112 |
| Citizenship Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person | 114 |
| Empirical Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person | 120 |
| Conclusion | 124 |
| References | 125 |
7. | Defense of Rawls's Political Conception of the Person | 127 |
| Metaphysical Commitments and Rawls's Political Conception of the Person | 127 |
| Rawls's Political Conception of the Person Versus Nonpublic or Moral Identity | 131 |
| Details of Rawls's Political Conception of the Person | 133 |
| Responses to Metaphysical Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person | 140 |
| Response to Normative Objections to Rawls's Political Conception of the Person | 145 |
| Response to the Objection on the Grounds of Valuing the Capacity for Choice | 145 |
| Response to Citizenship Objections | 148 |
| Response to Empirical Objections | 152 |
| Conclusion | 156 |
| References | 156 |
8. | Rawlsian Political Identity | 159 |
| Why does Political Identity Matter? | 160 |
| Schechtman on Personal Identity | 161 |
| The Reidentification Question | 161 |
| The Characterization Question | 162 |
| The Characteristics that Matter for Political Identity | 164 |
| The Rawlsian Conception of Political Identity | 166 |
| Why Rawlsian Political Identity? | 166 |
| The Details of the Rawlsian Conception of Political Identity | 167 |
| Assessing and Modifying the Rawlsian Conception of Political Identity | 172 |
| Perfectionism and Rawlsian Political Identity | 176 |
| Conclusion | 183 |
| References | 184 |
| Index | 185 |