| Description |
1 online resource |
| Series |
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Ser. ; v. 5 |
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Oxford studies in agency and responsibility ; v. 5.
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| Contents |
Cover; Oxford Studiesin Agency and Responsibility; Copyright; Contents; List of Contributors; Introduction; 1: Watsonian Compatibilism; 1.1 FREE AGENCY: MESH THEORIES, IDENTIFICATION, AND THE REAL SELF; 1.2 TWO CRITICISMS AND A DIAGNOSIS; 1.3 AGAINST IDENTIFICATION AND REAL SELF VIEWS; 1.4 FOR AN ABILITY-BASED WATSONIAN MESH THEORY; 1.5 WEAK-WILLED AGENCY AND REASONS-RESPONSIVENESS: HAMMERING OUT THE DETAILS; 1.6 WHAT KIND OF REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORY?; 1.7 WATSONIAN FREE AGENCY AND WATSONIAN MORALLY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY |
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1.8 WATSONIAN MORALLY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY AND STRAWSONIAN MORALLY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY1.9 UNSETTLED BUSINESS; 1.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS; References; 2: Attributability and the Self; 2.1 EXEGESIS; 2.2 A PROBLEMATIC AMBIGUITY; 2.3 ATTRIBUTABILITY, SELF-DISCLOSURE, AND THE REAL SELF; 2.4 TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT ATTRIBUTABILITY; 2.5 ACCOUNTABILITY; 2.6 BLAME, NEGATIVE ATTITUDES, AND MORAL SANCTIONS; 2.7 BLAME; 2.8 THE CRITICISM/BLAME MODEL; 2.9 CONCLUSION; References; 3: I'll Bet You Think This Blame is About You; 3.1 JUSTIFYING RESPONSES TO MORAL FAILURE; 3.1.1 Which Responses?; 3.1.2 Beyond Two Faces |
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3.1.3 The Non-Voluntary3.1.4 Non-Voluntary Reactions to Moral Failure; 3.1.5 Case Studies; 3.1.6 Further Questions of Justification; 3.1.7 Summary; 3.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MORAL FAILURE AND REACTIONS THERETO; References; 4: Moral Address: What it Is, Why it Matters; 4.1 WHAT IT IS; 4.2 WHY IT MATTERS I; 4.3 WHY IT MATTERS II; References; 5: Gary Watson: Strawsonian; 5.1 STRAWSON'S VIEW OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY; 5.2 THE BEARING OF WATSON'S EARLY WORK ON STRAWSON'S VIEW; 5.3 WHY WATSON IS WRONG ABOUT UNEXERCISED CAPACITIES; 5.4 ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR STRAWSON AND WATSON |
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5.5 A POSITIVE SUGGESTIONReferences; 6: Learning from Psychopaths; References; 7: Competence, Attributability, and Blame: Resolving the Responsibility of the Psychopath; 7.1 THE ISSUE: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PSYCHOPATH; 7.2 WATSON, THE LINKAGE THESIS AND PSYCHOPATHIC ANORMATIVITY; 7.2.1 Are Psychopaths Morally Responsible? First Pass; 7.2.2 Accountability and Attributability; 7.2.3 Second Pass: Two Faces, Four Theses; 7.2.4 Psychopathy and the Law: Penalties, Punishment, and Responsibility; 7.2.4.1 Fair Choice Theory; 7.2.4.2 Attributability and accountability in criminal punishment |
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7.3 CONCLUSIONReferences; 8: Moral and Criminal Responsibility: Answering and Refusing to Answer; 8.1 ACCOUNTABILITY, ANSWERABILITY, AND LIABILITY; 8.2 BEING ABLE TO ANSWER; 8.3 LISTENING TO THE ANSWER; 8.4 REFUSING TO ANSWER; References; 9: Compromised Addicts; 9.1 INTRODUCTION; 9.2 THE PUZZLE OF MOTIVATIONAL CONFLICT AND INABILITY; 9.3 THE NATURE OF WHOLEHEARTEDNESS; 9.4 THE PUZZLE AND THE TRADITIONAL INCOMPATIBILIST OBJECTION TO CONDITIONAL ANALYSES; 9.5 GARY'S SOLUTION TO THE PUZZLE; 9.6 ASSESSING ACCOUNTS OF THE ADDICT'S BURDEN; 9.7 THE DEMAND-WEAKENING FEATURE; 9.8 SOME IMPLICATIONS |
| Summary |
No one has written more insightfully on the promises and perils of human agency than Gary Watson, who has spent a career thinking about issues such as moral responsibility, blame, free will, addiction, and psychopathy. This text pays tribute to Watson's work by taking up and extending themes from his pioneering essays |
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No one has written more insightfully on the promises and perils of human agency than Gary Watson, who has spent a career thinking about issues such as moral responsibility, blame, free will, weakness of will, addiction, and psychopathy. The chapters of this volume pay tribute to Watson's work by taking up and extending themes from his pioneering essays. Themes covered include:: compatibilist views of freedom and moral responsibility, the distinction between attributability and accountability, the responsibility of psychopaths, the nature of blame and its relationship to morality, the relevance of addiction to responsibility, the continuing influence of P.F. Strawson's work, the connection between criminal and moral responsibility, the philosophical development of Gary Watson and the ways Watson's views have changed over time. Contributors include: Michael McKenna, Susan Wolf, Pamela Hieronymi, R. Jay Wallace, Michael Smith, T.M. Scanlon, Jeanette Kennett, Antony Duff, Gideon Yaffe, Gary Watson, Sarah Buss, Neal Tognazzini, and D. Justin Coates |
| Notes |
This edition previously issued in print: 2019 |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Audience |
Specialized |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from home page (viewed on February 7, 2019) |
| Subject |
Watson, Gary, 1943-
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Agent (Philosophy)
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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Agent (Philosophy)
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Coates, D. Justin, editor
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Tognazzini, Neal A., editor
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| ISBN |
9780191868931 |
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0191868930 |
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9780192565945 |
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019256594X |
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