| Description |
1 online resource (304 pages) |
| Contents |
Cover; Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility: Volume 6; Copyright; Acknowledgments; Contents; List of Contributors; Introduction to OSAR 6; 1: Control, Attitudes, and Accountability; 1.1 The First Horn: Deny Direct Accountability for our Reasons-Responsive Attitudes; 1.2 The Second Horn: Deny the Necessity of Control for Accountability; 1.3 The Third Horn: Deny that the Relevant Sort of Control is Volitional Control; 1.4 Conclusion; References; 2: Self-Control and Moral Security; Introduction; 2.1 Self-Control; 2.1.1 Strategies and Techniques of Self-Control |
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2.1.2 Diachronic Self-Control and Mental Time Travel2.1.3 Agency and Self-Control; 2.1.4 Self-Control, Diachronic Agency, and Flourishing Lives; 2.1.5 Self-Control Undermined; 2.2 Moral Security and Moral Injury; 2.2.1 Moral Security Undermined; 2.3 Race, Moral Security, and Self-Control; 2.3.1 Respectability Politics and the Demand for Self-Control; 2.3.2 The Impact of Respectability Politics on Self-Control; 2.3.3 Whose Self-Control Matters?; 2.4 Poverty, Moral Security, and Self-Control; 2.4.1 Poverty and Self-Control; 2.4.1.A The Demand for Self-Control and the Expectation of Gratitude |
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2.4.1.B Poverty, Willpower, and Strategies of Self-Control2.4.1.C Possibility, Identity and Normative Self-Control; 2.5 Conclusion; Bibliography; 3: (En)joining Others; References; 4: Who's Afraid of a Little Resentment?; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Strawsonian Methodology; 4.3 The Argument from Moral Sanction; 4.4 The Argument from Communication; 4.5 Conclusion: Further Reflections on Methodology; References; 5: Shame and Attributability; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Accountability and Control; 5.3 Attributability and Self-blame; 5.4 Attributability and Shame; 5.5 Fitting Shame |
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5.6 Fittingness and Desert5.7 Deserved Guilt, Fitting Shame, and Control; 5.8 Concluding Remarks; Acknowledgements; References; 6: The Minimal Approval Account of Attributability; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Motivation for the Project; A. The Appeal of Deep Self Views; B. Failure to Locate a Necessary Condition on Attributability; 6.3 The Account; A. Partial Endorsement; B. Hypothetical versus Explicit Endorsement; C. Approval: Endorsement with a Further Aim than Elimination; 6.4 Advantages of the View; A. Capacity without Process |
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B. Criterion Operates Independently of the Type of Mental State That Causes Action6.5 Conclusion; References; 7: Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Do False Moral Views Exculpate?; 7.3 Objection: My Opponent Can Agree that Carl, Dawn, and George Are Blameless; 7.4 Can Moral Testimony Provide Moral Knowledge?; 7.5 The Worry: A Tension between my Two Answers; 7.6 My Proposed Solution to the Worry: Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far; 7.7 Objections to my Proposed Solution; 7.8 Conclusion; References; 8: Contemporary Neuroscience's Epiphenomenal Challenge to Responsibility; 8.1 |
| Summary |
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a forum for outstanding new work in an area of vigorous and broad-ranging debate in philosophy and beyond. What is involved in human action? Can philosophy and science illuminate debate about free will? How should we answer questions about responsibility for action? |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on December 05, 2019) |
| Subject |
Responsibility.
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Act (Philosophy)
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Agent (Philosophy)
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Act (Philosophy)
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Agent (Philosophy)
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Responsibility
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Shoemaker, David, 1964- editor.
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| ISBN |
9780192584274 |
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0192584278 |
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9780191880711 |
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019188071X |
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