Table of Contents |
1. | Introduction | 1 |
2. | Rethinking Rationality | 9 |
2.1. | The Reconciliation of Ethical Rationalism, Ethical Naturalism, Virtue Ethics, and the Biological and Social Sciences | 9 |
2.1.1. | Reasserting the Compatibility of the Methodologies of Value Theory and of the Sciences | 10 |
2.1.2. | Reasserting the Compatibility of Virtue Ethics and Deontological Rationalism | 24 |
2.2. | The Failure of Axiological Anti-foundationalism | 29 |
2.2.1. | The Ideological Dangers of Anti-foundationalism | 29 |
2.2.2. | The Problem of Indeterminacy: Amartya Sen's Theory of Justice | 32 |
2.2.3. | Karl-Otto Apel's Rebuttal to the Munchhausen Trilemma and Its Relevance to Value Theory | 35 |
2.3. | The Concept of Rationality: Toward a Universal Model | 36 |
2.3.1. | Concepts, Conceptions, and the Possibility of a Universal Model | 37 |
2.3.2. | "Humaniqueness," Social Cognitive Theory, and a Neuroscientific Account of Judgment | 40 |
2.3.3. | Inadequacies and Limitations of Competing Accounts | 45 |
2.3.4. | The Necessary Methodological Preconditions of Universal Applicability | 53 |
2.3.5. | The Model Explicated and Analyzed | 54 |
2.3.6. | Consequences for a Doctrine of Liberation | 61 |
2.4. | Concluding Remarks | 63 |
3. | Rationality and Dialectical Necessity | 65 |
3.1. | Prescription, Preference, and Dialectical Contingence | 65 |
3.1.1. | A Refutation of Harean Anti-descriptivism | 67 |
3.1.2. | Hare's Dialectical Method | 79 |
3.2. | Developing a Method of Justification | 91 |
3.2.1. | The Problem of a Justificatory Method | 91 |
3.2.2. | Problems in Walton's Model of Justification | 93 |
3.2.3. | The Justificatory Model Explicated and Analyzed | 97 |
3.3. | A Sound Positive Account, Part I: An Analysis of Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism | 106 |
3.3.1. | The Basic Elements of Gewirthian Theory | 106 |
3.3.2. | The Premises and Conclusion Reconstructed and Analyzed | 111 |
3.3.3. | Applications to Animal Ethics and the Principle of Proportionality | 114 |
3.3.4. | Applications to Positive Rights | 120 |
3.3.5. | Applications to Classic Moral Dilemmas, the Principle of Double Effect, and Intention | 122 |
3.3.6. | Position A: Incompleteness and Equal Justifiability | 127 |
3.3.7. | Position B: The Self-Contract | 129 |
3.3.8. | Position C: Double Effect, Contrary Double Effect, and Synthetic Double Effect Derived from the PGC | 133 |
3.3.9. | Conclusion and Synthesis | 135 |
3.4. | A Sound Positive Account, Part II: An Analysis of Habermas's Discourse Ethics | 139 |
3.4.1. | Critical Theory, Interaction, and Communicative Ethics | 142 |
3.4.2. | Habermas, Gewirth, and the Inescapability from the Monological | 147 |
3.4.3. | Clarifying the Mirror Image | 150 |
3.4.4. | Epistemological Uncertainty and Alter-Contradiction: A Reconstruction of the Habermasean Argument | 153 |
3.4.5. | Applications to Moral Dilemmas: The Right to Discourse | 155 |
3.4.6. | Applications to Property Theory | 157 |
3.4.7. | The Baker and the Starving Man | 162 |
3.4.8. | The Right to Discourse, Self-Sacrifice, and the Antique Clock | 165 |
3.4.9. | Historical Arguments for a Reinterpretation of Habermasean Ethics | 169 |
3.4.10. | Concluding Remarks: The Single-Person Problem | 172 |
4. | The Dialectical Structure of Value Judgments | 175 |
4.1. | The Dialectical Structure of "Ought" and "Must" | 175 |
4.1.1. | The Harean Account of Imperative, Indicative, and Conditional Statements | 175 |
4.1.2. | Actuality, Subjunctivity, and Conditionality | 178 |
4.1.3. | Implications of Gewirthian Theory for Deontic Meaning | 188 |
4.2. | The Dialectical Structure of Rights and Duties | 190 |
4.2.1. | Relativism and the Correlativity of Rights, Duties, and "Must" | 190 |
4.2.2. | Rights, Duties, and Anachronism | 193 |
4.2.3. | Concluding Remarks | 194 |
5. | Virtue and the Search for Intrinsic Goodness | 197 |
5.1. | Magnell's Challenge | 197 |
5.1.1. | Probing the Predicative-Attributive Distinction | 198 |
5.1.2. | The Definitive Criteria for Value Intrinsicality | 200 |
5.2. | Problems in Searle's Epistemology of Function | 202 |
5.2.1. | The Social Construction of Function | 202 |
5.2.2. | The Problem of Classification in the Absence of Essence | 205 |
5.2.3. | Functions, Mental States, and the Background | 209 |
5.2.4. | Concluding Remarks | 210 |
5.3. | The Life Framework: The Significance of Foot's Virtue Theory | 212 |
5.3.1. | Function, Necessity, and the Grammar of Goodness | 213 |
5.3.2. | The Magnitude of the Implications | 216 |
6. | Beyond Dialectical Necessity: Assertoric Necessity and the Grammar of Goodness | 221 |
6.1. | Reflexive Intrinsicality and the Teleologically Comparative Tendential Necessity of Functions | 222 |
6.1.1. | Assaying Some Peculiarities | 222 |
6.1.2. | The Good-for Thesis | 223 |
6.1.3. | The Reflexive Intrinsicality of Goodness | 224 |
6.1.4. | Tendency, Necessity, and Function | 226 |
6.1.5. | Applications to Goodness | 232 |
6.1.6. | A Naturalistic Definition of Goodness | 234 |
6.1.7. | First Proof of Intrinsic Goodness | 236 |
6.1.8. | Second Proof of Intrinsic Goodness | 238 |
6.1.9. | The Universality of Goodness and the Comparison of Goods | 240 |
6.1.10. | Objection to Betterness and Reply | 242 |
6.1.11. | A Naturalistic Definition of Betterness | 243 |
6.1.12. | Objections and Replies | 246 |
6.1.13. | Teleological Comparativeness | 248 |
6.1.14. | Objections and a Reply via the Argument to the Commensurability of Teloi | 250 |
6.1.15. | Comparison and the Telos of Betterness | 252 |
6.1.16. | Another Objection to the Commensurability of Teloi and a Reply | 256 |
6.1.17. | Conceptual Connections to the Non-Descriptivist Fallacy | 259 |
6.1.18. | Objections on Grounds of Inherent Relativity and a Reply | 260 |
6.1.19. | Objection on Grounds of Failure to Prove that Value Is a Natural Property and a Reply | 262 |
6.1.20. | Objection on Grounds of Dialectical Necessity and a Reply | 263 |
6.1.21. | Objection on Grounds of the Intrinsicality-Finality Distinction and a Reply | 264 |
6.1.22. | Final Considerations: The Inadequacy of Summation and Aggregative Models of Value | 265 |
6.2. | The Summum Bonum | 267 |
6.2.1. | From Value to Rationality: The Fundamental Link Elucidated | 268 |
6.2.2. | Justifying a Summum Bonum | 272 |
6.2.3. | Logical Judgment | 275 |
6.2.4. | Conceptual Synthesis | 276 |
6.2.5. | Conceptual Abstraction | 278 |
6.2.6. | Freedom | 279 |
6.2.7. | Wisdom and the Unity of the Virtues | 281 |
6.2.8. | Objections and Reply | 282 |
6.2.9. | The Question of Attainability | 284 |
6.2.10. | Phronesis, Eudaimonia, and Nirvana | 287 |
6.2.11. | The Question of Individual Telos | 290 |
6.2.12. | Some Implications for Aesthetics | 291 |
6.2.13. | The Question of Individual Telos Revisited: The Relevance of Phenomenology | 292 |
6.2.14. | Gewirth and Habermas Revisited | 296 |
6.2.15. | The Single-Person Problem Resolved | 298 |
6.2.16. | The Final Assessment: Choosing a Model | 299 |
6.3. | Conclusion | 300 |
6.3.1. | The Eternal Nature of the Summum Bonum | 300 |
6.3.2. | Enlightenment and Liberation | 302 |
7. | Conclusion | 309 |
7.1. | The Eternal Nature of the Summum Bonum | 309 |
7.2. | Enlightenment and Liberation | 310 |
7.3. | Preliminary Implications for Political Theory | 313 |
| Bibliography | 319 |