| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
1 For and Against Robustness 1 -- The No-Miracles Argument for Robustness 2 -- Probabilistic Approaches to Robustness 8 -- Pragmatic Approaches to Robustness 25 -- Epistemic Independence Approaches to Robustness 36 -- Summary 51 -- 2 The Mesosome: A Case of Mistaken Observation 52 -- Introducing the Mesosome: Rasmussen and Culp 55 -- The Mesosome Experiments 59 -- Reliable Process Reasoning 65 -- Rasmussen's Indeterminism 72 -- 3 The WIMP: The Value of Model Independence 79 -- Dark Matter and WIMPs 81 -- DAMA's Model-Independent Approach 82 -- Model-Dependent Approaches to Detecting WIMPS 88 -- An Historical Argument Against Robustness 93 -- Reliable Process Reasoning 97 -- 4 Perrin's Atoms and Molecules 103 -- Perrin's Table 104 -- The Viscosity of Gases 107 -- Brownian Movement: Vertical Distributions in Emulsions 116 -- Brownian Movement: Displacement, Rotation and Diffusion of Brownian Particles 124 -- Taking Stock 130 -- Perrin's Realism about Molecules 134 -- 5 Dark Matter and Dark Energy 139 -- Dark Matter and the Bullet Cluster 142 -- Type la Supernovae and Dark Energy 150 -- Defeating Systematic Errors: The Smoking Gun 159 -- Robustness in the Dark Energy Case 166 -- 6 Final Considerations Against Robustness 169 -- Independence and the Core Argument 170 -- The Need for Independence Does Not Equal the Need for Robustness 174 -- The Converse to Robustness Is Normally Resisted 179 -- The Corroborating Witness: Not a Case of Robustness 182 -- No Robustness Found in Mathematics and Logic 189 -- Robustness Fails to Ground Representational Accuracy 195 -- The Sociological Dimension of Robustness 198 -- 7 Robustness and Scientific Realism 201 -- The No-Miracles Argument for Scientific Realism 202 -- In Support of Theoretical Preservationism 204 -- Objections to Theoretical Preservationism 208 -- Realism, the Pessimistic Meta-Induction and Preservationism 218 -- The Improved Standards Response: 'Methodological Preservationism' 226 |
| Summary |
In Seeing Things, Robert Hudson assesses a common way of arguing about observation reports called "robustness reasoning." Robustness reasoning claims that an observation report is more likely to be true if the report is produced by multiple, independent sources. Seeing Things argues that robustness reasoning lacks the special value it is often claimed to have. Hudson exposes key flaws in various popular philosophical defenses of robustness reasoning. This philosophical critique of robustness is extended by recounting five episodes in the history of science (from experimental microbiology, atomic theory, astrophysics and astronomy) where robustness reasoning is -- or could be claimed to have been -- used. Hudson goes on to show that none of these episodes do in fact exhibit robustness reasoning. In this way, the significance of robustness reasoning is rebutted on both philosophical and historical grounds. But the book does more than critique robustness reasoning. It also develops a better defense of the informative value of observation reports. The book concludes by relating insights into the failure of robustness reasoning to a popular approach to scientific realism called "(theoretical) preservationism." Hudson argues that those who defend this approach to realism commit similar errors to those who advocate robustness reasoning. In turn, a new form of realism is formulated and defended. Called "methodological preservationism," it recognizes the fundamental value of naked eye observation to scientists -- and the rest of us |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Observation (Scientific method)
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Science -- Philosophy.
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Observation
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SCIENCE -- Research & Methodology.
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Observation (Scientific method)
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Science -- Philosophy
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780199303298 |
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0199303290 |
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