| Description |
1 online resource : text file, PDF |
| Series |
Routledge Revivals |
| Contents |
Cover; Half Title; Dedication; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Preface; Series Editorâ#x80;#x99;s Preface; Chapter 1 Introduction; 1. TVE Sector and Its Role in Chinaâ#x80;#x99;s Economic Growth; 2. TVEsâ#x80;#x99; Organization and the Focus of the Research; 3. The Sources and the Methodology; 4. The Organization of the Book; Chapter 2 Local Government Leaders, Firm Managers, and the Two-tier Property Rights Structure of Collective TVEs; 1. The Dual Role of Local Leaders in Rural Organization; 2. The Objectives and Incentives of Local Leaders; 2.1 The Objectives; 2.2 The Incentives |
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3. The Property Rights Structure of Collective TVEs3.1 Property Rights Theory; 3.2 The Property Rights Structure in Socialist Public Enterprises; 3.3 The Property Rights of Collective TVEs; 4. The Advantage of Local Leaders as defacto Owner of Collective TVEs; 4.1 Securing Property Rights; 4.2 Access to Resources; 4.3 Uncertainty and Risk Absorption; 5. TVE Managers as the Agents of Local Community Government; 5.1 The Re-delegation of the Control Rights from Community Government to Firm Managers; 5.2 The Constitution of TVE Managers; 5.3 The Governance of Collective TVEs |
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Chapter 3 The Contractual Structure of Collective TVEs1. The Contractual Forms Implemented in Collective TVEs; 1.1 The Work-point System; 1.2 The Wage/Salary System; 1.3 The Collective Contractual Responsibility System; 1.4 The Personal Contractual Responsibility System; 1.5 Leasing System; 1.6 Auction; 2. The Share-cooperative System; 3. Three Categories of the Managerial Contractual Forms; 4. The Coexistence, Evolution, and Cross-regional Variation in the Contractual Structure of Collective TVEs; Chapter 4 Modeling the Contractual Structure of Collective TVEs |
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1. Institutions and Induced Institutional Innovation: A Brief Review of Institutional Economics1.1 Institutions and Institutional Economics; 1.2 Institutions of Governance; 1.3 Contracting with Positive Transaction Costs; 1.4 Governance Structure and Transaction Costs; 1.5 Induced Institutional Innovation; 2. What Factors May Determine the Contractual Form of TVEs?; 3. The Model; 4. Model Simulations and Implications; 4.1 The Space Partition of Dominant Contractual Form; 4.2 The Divergence in Firmâ#x80;#x99;s Technical Structure; 4.3 Changes in the Relative Importance of External Management |
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4.4 Changes in Opportunity IncomesChapter 5 Explaining the Contractual Form Innovation in Collective TVEs; 1. Empirical Tests of the Model: The Explanatory Power of Model Predicted Factors; 1.1 The Development of Markets; 1.2 The Technical Structure of the Firm; 1.3 The Economic Setting of the Locality; 2. Empirical Tests of the Model: The Relative Importance of Model Predicted Factors; 2.1 The Model and the Variables; 2.2 The Data; 2.3 The Results and the Explanations; 2.4 Conclusions; Chapter 6 Endogenous Reform and Induced Privatization: Concluding Remarks; 1. Introduction |
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2. The Endogenous Model of Economic Reform: â#x80;#x98;Induced Privatizationâ#x80;#x99 |
| Summary |
"This title was first published in 2000: This work provides a new insight into china's township and village enterprises (TVEs). It views the governance structure of TVEs as effectively combining the comparative advantage of local government officials in external management and of dual firm managers in internal management to overcome imperfections in both market and government during the transitional period. Through extensive field investigation analysis and case studies, this work shows that the governance structure of TVEs has been evolving during the past fifteen years. To adapt to the changing environment, TVEs have continuously innovated firm contractual form from a government official dominant fixed-wage form to a partnership style profit-sharing form, then to a privatization oriented fixed-rent form. This work develops a complete model to explain how the central government's partial reform efforts in market liberalization have become the driving force to induce the contractual form innovation, and to explicate how heterogeneity in firms' technical structures and in local economic settings may affect local government's decisions regarding contractual form innovation. Using the author's unique data set, the model simulations predict that the development in the whole market system will result in the diffusion of contractual form innovation and lead to an 'induced privatization' in this sector. The following empirical studies show this to be a powerful prediction and the progress toward such 'induced privatization' can be expected in China in near future. This research work provides a rich empirical study on China's institutional transition towards a market system. It explains how a bottom-up endogenous, instead of top-down exogenous, property rights reform can be realized in transitional economies. This work will serve as a valuable reference for researchers and students in economics, economic development and institutional economics - and especially for those interested in research."--Provided by publisher |
| Subject |
Rural industries -- China.
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Producer cooperatives -- China
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Government ownership -- China
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Privatization -- China
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Industrial policy -- China
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Economic policy
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Government ownership
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Industrial policy
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Privatization
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Producer cooperatives
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Rural industries
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| SUBJECT |
China -- Economic policy -- 1976-2000.
http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85024024
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| Subject |
China
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781315211305 |
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1315211300 |
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