| Description |
1 online resource (274 pages) |
| Contents |
PERSONAL IDENTITY -- Title -- Illustrations -- Contributors -- Introduction -- THE PROJECT -- THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- THE DEBATE ABOUT PERSONAL IDENTITY -- THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH -- THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH -- TWO PROBLEMS FOR COMPLEX APPROACHES -- FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM -- THE SIMPLE VIEW -- CONCLUSION -- PART I. : Framing the question -- 1. Chitchat on personal identity -- 2. In search of the simple view -- SIMPLE AND COMPLEX VIEWS -- PRELIMINARIES -- GROUNDING AND CRITERIA -- ANTI-CRITERIALISM -- ANALYZABILITY -- ADVOCATES OF ANALYTIC CRITERIALISM |
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EMPIRICIST THEORIESBRUTENESS -- NOONAN'S PROPOSAL -- SPECIFIC AND UNSPECIFIC -- EXPLANATORY DEMANDS -- 3. Personal identity, indeterminacy and obligation -- PERSONAL IDENTITY AND INDETERMINACY -- INDETERMINACY AND OBLIGATION -- INDETERMINACY AND MORAL DILEMMAS -- OBJECTIONS TO EPISTEMICISM -- INDETERMINACY AND SUBJECTIVISM -- 4. Personal identity and its perplexities -- INTRODUCTION -- THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX VIEW OF DIACHRONIC PERSONAL IDENTITY -- THE INDEXICALITY OF THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON -- THE COMPLEX VIEW AND INDETERMINACY |
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PART II. : Arguments for and against simplicity -- 5. : How to determine which is the true -- THE PROBLEM -- LOGICAL POSSIBILITY -- A POSTERIORI METAPHYSICAL POSSIBILITY -- THE HUMAN SOUL -- 6. Against simplicity -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- 7. The probable simplicity of personal identity -- WHY SHOULD WE SEEK A CRITERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- IDENTITY FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW -- WHAT IS A PERSON -- LOCKE'S CRITERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- THE FATAL CIRCULARITY IN ANY NEO-LOCKEAN CRITERION -- REPLY TO AN OBJECTION -- 8. Reply to E.J. Lowe |
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9. The non-descriptive individual nature of conscious beingsINTRODUCTION -- THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND METAPHYSICAL BASES OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXISTENCE -- NON-DESCRIPTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXISTENCE -- THE INDIVIDUAL NATURE OF A STONE -- PERFECT COUNTERPARTS OF CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUALS -- THE CENTRAL CONCEPTUAL DISANALOGY -- CLARIFICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTUAL DISANALOGY CLAIM -- THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE EXISTENCE OF CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUALS -- IMPLICIT CONCEPTS AND PHILOSOPHICAL INSIGHTS -- ACCESS TO THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUS BEINGS ON THE BASIS OF BEING A CONSCIOUS BEING |
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PART III. : Reconsidering simplicity -- 10. : Personal identity: a not-so-simple simple view -- WHAT IS A SIMPLE VIEW OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- A FIRST-PERSONAL APPROACH -- WHY NOT-SO-SIMPLE -- DO PERSONS HAVE PARTS -- WHY THERE ARE NO INFORMATIVE CRITERIA OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES -- CONCLUSION -- 11. Is "person" a sortal term -- INTRODUCTORY REMARKS -- "PERSON" IS A SORTAL TERM -- THE DON'T CARE VIEW -- "PERSON" IS A SEMANTICALLY UNIQUE TERM -- THE KIND OF PERSONS -- THE INDIVIDUAL FORM OF PERSONS -- THE UNITY-OF-CONSCIOUSNESS ARGUMENT |
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12. Materialism, dualism, and "simple" theories of personal identity |
| Summary |
This book addresses whether personal identity is analyzable, with innovative discussion of 'complex' and 'simple' theories |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Identity (Psychology)
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PHILOSOPHY -- Mind & Body.
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PSYCHOLOGY -- Personality.
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Identity (Psychology)
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Identität
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Persönlichkeitstheorie
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Jaget.
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Identitet (psykologi)
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Gasser, Georg
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Stefan, Matthias
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| ISBN |
9781139840071 |
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9781139844819 |
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1139844814 |
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113984007X |
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9781139028486 |
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1139028480 |
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9781283836227 |
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128383622X |
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9781139842457 |
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1139842455 |
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9781107538924 |
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1107538920 |
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