Description |
1 online resource |
Series |
Political economy of institutions and decisions |
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Political economy of institutions and decisions.
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Contents |
Cover -- Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments -- Series -- Dedication -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Preface -- ONE Introduction -- 1.1 Why Macroeconomic Adjustment Becomes Necessary -- 1.2 How and When Do Policymakers Adjust? Existing Explanations -- 1.2.1 Choosing between Internal and External Adjustment -- 1.2.2 The Timing of Macroeconomic Adjustment -- 1.2.3 Open Questions -- 1.3 The Argument -- 1.3.1 Explaining Voters' Vulnerabilities to Internal and External Adjustment -- 1.3.2 Explaining Government Choices on Type and Timing of Macroeconomic Adjustment -- 1.4 The Plan of the Book -- TWO Individual Vulnerability to Macroeconomic Adjustment -- 2.1 The Distributional Effects of External Adjustment -- 2.1.1 Direct Effects of External Adjustment on Voters -- 2.1.1.1 Relative Price Effects: Purchasing Power Concerns -- 2.1.1.2 The Financial Side: Personal Balance Sheet Concerns -- 2.1.2 Indirect Effects of External Adjustment on Voters -- 2.1.2.1 Employment-Specific Effects: Competitiveness and Financial Concerns Revisited -- 2.1.2.2 General Economic Effects of External Adjustment -- 2.1.3 The Net Effect of External Adjustment on Voters -- 2.2 The Distributional Effects of Internal Adjustment -- 2.2.1 Direct Effects of Internal Adjustment on Voters -- 2.2.1.1 Monetary Tightening: Personal Balance Sheet Concerns -- 2.2.1.2 Contractionary Fiscal Policy: Direct Effects on Voters -- 2.2.1.3 Structural Reform: Direct Effects on Voters -- 2.2.2 Indirect Effects of Internal Adjustment on Voters -- 2.2.2.1 The Employment-Specific Effect of Internal Adjustment -- 2.2.2.2 General Economic Effects of Internal Adjustment -- 2.2.3 The Net Effect of Internal Adjustment on Voters -- 2.3 The Vulnerability Profile and Voters' Preferences on External and Internal Adjustment -- 2.4 Conclusion |
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THREE Direct Vulnerabilities to Adjustment -- 3.1 Voter Evaluations of Economic Policy Outcomes during the 2008-2010 Global Financial and Economic Crisis: Research Design -- 3.1.1 Research Strategy -- 3.1.2 The Dependent Variable: Economic Repercussions of the Crisis -- 3.1.3 Independent Variables: Voter Vulnerabilities and Macroeconomic Adjustment Strategies -- 3.1.3.1 Direct Vulnerability to External Adjustment -- 3.1.3.2 Direct Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment -- 3.1.4 Control Variables and Method -- 3.2 How Exchange Rate Changes Affect Voters Vulnerable to External Adjustment -- 3.3 How Internal Adjustment Affects Voters' Evaluations of the Severity of Crisis Repercussions -- 3.4 Conclusion -- FOUR Indirect Vulnerabilities to Adjustment -- 4.1 How Firms Assess Their Vulnerabilities to Exchange-Rate and Monetary Policy -- 4.1.1 The Data -- 4.1.2 Measuring Firm-Specific Vulnerabilities to Exchange-Rate and Monetary Policy -- 4.1.3 Firm-Level and Country-Level Variation in Vulnerabilities -- 4.2 The Determinants of Firms' Vulnerabilities to External Adjustment -- 4.2.1 Operationalization -- 4.2.2 Method -- 4.2.3 Results -- 4.3 The Determinants of Firms' Vulnerabilities to Internal Adjustment -- 4.3.1 Operationalization and Method -- 4.3.2 Results -- 4.4 Firms' Overall Vulnerabilities to Macroeconomic Adjustment -- 4.4.1 Operationalization and Method -- 4.4.2 Results -- 4.5 Conclusion -- FIVE Interests, Elections, and Policymakers' Incentives to Adjust -- 5.1 To Adjust or Not to Adjust? And If So, When and How? The Government's Decision Problem -- 5.2 The Voter's Viewpoint: Policy Outcomes and Vote Choice -- 5.3 How the Electorate's Vulnerability Profile Affects Policymakers' Choices about the Speed and Type of Adjustment -- 5.3.1 The Timing of Adjustment -- 5.3.2 The Choice of Adjustment Strategies -- 5.4 Conclusion |
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SIX Adjustment in the Asian Financial Crisis -- 6.1 Thailand: Delayed Adjustment and Exchange-Rate Crash -- 6.1.1 Thailand's Policy Response to the Asian Financial Crisis -- 6.1.2 The Distribution of Vulnerabilities in Thailand -- 6.1.2.1 Vulnerability to External Adjustment -- 6.1.2.2 Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment -- 6.1.2.3 The Vulnerability Profile of the Thai Electorate -- 6.1.3 How Vulnerabilities to Adjustment Influenced Policy Choices in Thailand -- 6.1.4 Discussion -- 6.2 Taiwan: Speedy External Adjustment -- 6.2.1 Taiwan's Policy Response to the Asian Financial Crisis -- 6.2.2 The Distribution of Vulnerabilities in Taiwan -- 6.2.2.1 Vulnerability to External Adjustment -- 6.2.2.2 Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment -- 6.2.2.3 The Electorate's Vulnerability Profile in Taiwan -- 6.2.3 How Vulnerabilities to Adjustment Influenced Policy Choices in Taiwan -- 6.2.4 Discussion -- 6.3 Hong Kong: Immediate Internal Adjustment -- 6.3.1 Hong Kong's Policy Response to the Asian Financial Crisis -- 6.3.2 The Distribution of Vulnerabilities in Hong Kong -- 6.3.2.1 Vulnerability to External Adjustment -- 6.3.2.2 Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment -- 6.3.2.3 The Vulnerability Profile of Hong Kong's Electorate -- 6.3.3 How Vulnerabilities to Adjustment Influenced Policy Choices in Hong Kong -- 6.3.4 Discussion -- 6.4 South Korea: Delayed Adjustment and Exchange-Rate Crash -- 6.4.1 South Korea's Policy Response to the Asian Financial Crisis -- 6.4.2 The Distribution of Vulnerabilities in South Korea -- 6.4.2.1 Vulnerability to External Adjustment -- 6.4.2.2 Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment -- 6.4.2.3 The Vulnerability Profile of the South Korean Electorate -- 6.4.3 How Vulnerabilities to Adjustment Influenced Policy Choices in South Korea -- 6.4.4 Discussion -- 6.5 Conclusion -- 6.6 Appendix: List of Interviewees |
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SEVEN Adjustment in Eastern Europe during the Global Financial Crisis -- 7.1 Eastern European Responses to the Global Financial and Economic Crisis -- 7.1.1 Internal Adjustment: The Baltics and Bulgaria -- 7.1.2 Mixed Adjustment Strategies: Hungary and Romania -- 7.1.3 External Adjustment: Czech Republic and Poland -- 7.1.4 Conclusion: Variation in Adjustment Strategies in Eastern Europe -- 7.2 Vulnerabilities to Internal and External Adjustment across Eastern Europe -- 7.2.1 Direct and Indirect Vulnerabilities to External Adjustment -- 7.2.2 Direct and Indirect Vulnerabilities to Internal Adjustment -- 7.2.3 Vulnerability Profiles in Eastern Europe -- 7.3 The Distributional Politics of Adjustment to the Global Financial Crisis -- 7.3.1 Strong Support for Painful Reform: The Baltics and Bulgaria -- 7.3.2 A Mixed Bag: Hungary and Romania -- 7.3.3 Uncontroversial External Adjustment: The Czech Republic and Poland -- 7.4 Conclusion -- EIGHT Conclusions -- 8.1 Agenda for Future Research -- 8.2 Policy Implications -- References -- Index -- Series |
Summary |
This book explains why governments respond differently to macroeconomic problems and why necessary reforms are sometimes delayed until a serious financial crisis erupts |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
Notes |
Print version record |
Subject |
Economic stabilization -- Political aspects
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Financial crises
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Economics -- Macroeconomics.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Economic Conditions.
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Economic stabilization -- Political aspects
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Financial crises
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Politische Ökonomie
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Wirtschaftslenkung
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Finanzkrise
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Makroökonomie
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Entscheidungsfindung
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Entscheidungsträger
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Stabilitätspolitik
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Wahlverhalten
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Form |
Electronic book
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ISBN |
9781107294042 |
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1107294045 |
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1139236814 |
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9781139236812 |
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