| Description |
1 online resource (xxi, 198 pages) : illustrations |
| Contents |
Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution; Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest?; The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate?; The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules; Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest?; Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data; Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections; Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions; Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election; Epilogue |
| Summary |
"Approval Voting proposes a compelling way to elect some 500,000 officials in public elections. Under this system voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate (rather than the strongest minority candidate, as often occurs under plurality voting), its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and-by offering voters the opportunity to influence election outcomes more equitably-a probable increase in voter turnout."--Jacket |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 179-188) and index |
| In |
Springer e-books |
| Subject |
Voting, Plural.
|
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Voting, Plural -- United States
|
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Mathematics.
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Economics.
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Mathematics
|
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Economics
|
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economics.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Political Process -- Elections.
|
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Voting, Plural -- United States.
|
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Speltheorie.
|
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Voting, Plural.
|
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Matemáticas
|
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Economía
|
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Voting, Plural
|
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Speltheorie.
|
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United States
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Fishburn, Peter C.
|
| LC no. |
2006937105 |
| ISBN |
0387498958 |
|
9780387498959 |
|
0387498966 |
|
9780387498966 |
|
6610940525 |
|
9786610940523 |
|
