Title Government spending, legislature size, and the executive veto / Reza Baqir

Published [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001

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Description 1 online resource (29 pages) : illustrations Series IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/01/208 IMF working paper ; WP/01/208. Summary Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 28-29) Notes Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL English digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL Print version record Subject Expenditures, Public -- Econometric models Finance, Public -- Econometric models Executive power -- Econometric models Veto -- Econometric models Executive power -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models Expenditures, Public -- Econometric models Finance, Public -- Econometric models Form Electronic book Author International Monetary Fund. Research Department. ISBN 1283515725 9781283515726 145191928X 9781451919288 1462350674 9781462350674 145272279X 9781452722795 9786613828170 6613828173

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