| Description |
1 online resource (94 pages) : color illustrations, color maps |
| Contents |
Learning from why the war was not won. -- Looking at first (and continuing) causes: blundering into the wrong kind of "nation building". -- The threat to Afghanistan from the Afghan Central Government. -- A failed state created a failed economy. -- Failing to assess the civil side of Taliban gains. -- Putting the U.S. military withdrawal in context. -- The military lessons of a counterinsurgency, rather than a war against terrorism. -- The future of the Taliban, and the prospects for international terrorism. -- Properly assessing the cost of war in blood and dollars. -- The military side of the "hole in government;" strategic jingoism, and lack of planning, effectiveness measures, and conditionality. -- The lessons from neighboring and outside powers. -- The need for strategic triage |
| Summary |
It does not take much vision to predict that the collapse of the present Afghan government is now all too likely, and that if the current Afghan central government collapses, a partisan U.S. political battle over who lost Afghanistan will follow. This analysis explores these issues in depth, and it attempts to highlight the issues that must be addressed to learn the full range of lessons from the war. It is a thought piece, deliberately controversial, and written with the full understanding that many key aspects of the war remain classified or have not been addressed in open source reporting |
| Notes |
"August 9, 2021." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 93-94) |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF cover page (CSIS, viewed August 16, 2021) |
| Subject |
Afghan War, 2001-2021 -- Political aspects
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Disengagement (Military science)
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Armed Forces -- Political aspects.
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Disengagement (Military science)
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United States -- Armed Forces -- Political aspects -- Afghanistan
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United States -- Military policy -- Political aspects
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Afghanistan.
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United States.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.), publisher.
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