| Description |
1 online resource (ix, 78 pages) |
| Series |
Research report ; RR-498-ARA |
|
Research report (Rand Corporation) ; RR-498-ARA.
|
| Contents |
Introduction -- Case I: The Suez War, 1956 -- Case II: The Six-Day War, 1967 -- Case III: The raid on Osiraq, 1981 -- Case IV: The raid on al-Kibar, 2007 -- Conclusion |
| Summary |
"Might U.S. officials be surprised by an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities? This study examines key historical precedents, considering four cases in which Israeli leaders chose preemptive or preventive military strikes and had to decide whether to notify or consult with the United States: the Suez crisis of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, the 1981 strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor, and the 2007 bombing of Syria's al-Kibar nuclear facility"--Publisher's description |
| Notes |
"June 29, 2015"--Table of Contents page |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 75-78) |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (Rand Corporation, viewed July 21, 2015) |
| Subject |
Preemptive attack (Military science) -- Case studies
|
|
HISTORY -- Middle East -- Israel.
|
|
Diplomatic relations
|
|
Preemptive attack (Military science)
|
| SUBJECT |
Israel -- Foreign relations -- United States -- Case studies
|
|
United States -- Foreign relations -- Israel -- Case studies
|
|
Israel -- History, Military -- 20th century
|
| Subject |
Israel
|
|
United States
|
| Genre/Form |
Case studies
|
|
Military history
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Rand Corporation. National Security Research Division, issuing body.
|
| ISBN |
9780833084163 |
|
083308416X |
|
9780833093165 |
|
0833093169 |
|
