| Description |
1 online resource (86 pages) |
| Series |
IMF Working Papers |
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IMF Working Papers
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| Contents |
Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Literature; III. Migration Policy in the United States; 1. Number and Types of Non-Immigrant Visa Issuances, 2001-05; IV. Theoretical Framework; V. Data; A. Lobbying Expenditures; 2. Targeted Political Activity; 1. Scatter Plots Between Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions from Political Action Committees (PACs); B. Other Data; C. Summary Statistics; 2. Top 10 Spenders for Immigration, 2001-05; 3. Top 10 Sectors with the Highest Number of Visas, 2001-05 |
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4. Scatter Plot -- Lobbying Expenditures for Immigration and Number of Visas5. Scatter Plot -- Union Membership Rates and Number of Visas; 6. Scatter Plot -- Lobbying Expenditures for Immigration and Number of H1B Visas; 7. Scatter Plot -- Union Membership Rates and Number of H1B Visas; VI. Empirical Analysis; A. Main Results; 3. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, OLS; 4a. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Instrumental Variables; 4b. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Instrumental Variables -- First Stage; B. Additional Results |
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5. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Alternative Dependent Variables6. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Alternative Measure of Lobbying Expenditures; 7. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration, Campaign Contributions from PAC vs Lobbying Expenditures; C. Robustness Checks; VII. Conclusions; Appendix; A1. The Effects of a Migration Quota; A1a. Summary Statistics; A1b. Summary Statistics (in levels); A2. List of Issues; A3. Sample Lobbying Report -- Morrison Public Affairs Group; A4. Sample Lobbying Report -- Microsoft Corporation |
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A5. List of CPS Industries (Census Bureau Classification)A6. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration OLS, Robustness Checks; A7. Estimated Effect of Politics on Migration OLS, Robustness Checks; References; Footnotes |
| Summary |
While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business int |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Lobbying -- United States -- Econometric models
|
| SUBJECT |
United States -- Emigration and immigration -- Government policy -- Econometric models
|
| Subject |
United States
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Facchini, Giovanni
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|
Mayda, Anna Maria
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| ISBN |
9781452728896 |
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1452728895 |
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