Introduction : ambitious aims and meager plans -- Strategic assessment and non-combat operations -- The occupation of Germany -- "Phase IV" and the invasion of Iraq -- An occupation that never was : Korea, 1950-1951 -- State-building during escalation in Vietnam -- Conclusion : reviewing theoretical and policy implications
Summary
As the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to plan properly for risks associated with post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. This book investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. It argues that research from psychology - specifically, construal level theory - can help explain how individuals reason about the costs of post-conflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future
