| Description |
1 online resource (x, 290 p.) |
| Series |
Cornell studies in security affairs |
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Cornell studies in security affairs.
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| Contents |
PART 1. "THE BIG VICTORY, THE GREAT TASK": 1. The Communist debate over strategy ; 2. Plans, preparations, and objectives of the Tet Offensive -- PART 2. THE ORIGINS OF SURPRISE: 3. The sources of American biases ; 4. Missing the signals: July-November 1967 ; 5. Missing the signals: December 1967-30 January 1968 ; 6. Reacting to the Tet Offensive -- Conclusion: Explaining the failure of intelligence |
| Summary |
"In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing on Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response."--Back cover |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (p. 277-283) and index |
| Notes |
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL |
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Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed |
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digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve MiAaHDL pda |
| Subject |
Tet Offensive, 1968.
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975 -- Military intelligence
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975 -- United States.
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HISTORY -- Asia -- Southeast Asia.
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HISTORY -- Military -- Vietnam War.
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Military intelligence
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Tet-offensief.
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United States
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| LC no. |
2021699395 |
| ISBN |
9781501713354 |
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1501713353 |
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9781501713361 |
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1501713361 |
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