Central bank autonomy, and inflation and output performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and other countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-97 / prepared by Tonny Lybeck
Published
[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Dept., [1999]
The Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991, but for some time thereafter the ruble remained legal tender in the Baltic states, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union (BRO). The ruble zone gradually collapsed and the newly independent countries began to take responsibility for their own monetary policy. 2 The BRO countries could, for obvious reasons, not rely on a good track record, but had to establish an autonomous and accountable central bank in their respective countries, perhaps supplemented with a rule-based monetary policy, to ensure credibility. 3 Most of the BRO countries therefore adopted central bank legislation embracing these principles, but also reflecting local conditions in each country. This helps explain the many variations in central bank legislation of the 15 BRO countries in spite of the almost similar point of departure. The purpose of this paper is to compare central bank autonomy and accountability of each BRO country, as revealed by the central bank legislation until the end of 1997, with the corresponding inflation and output performance since the early 1990s
