| Description |
1 online resource (xiii, 250 pages) : illustrations |
| Contents |
Cover; Half-title page; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; Figures and Tables; Figures; Tables; Abbreviations; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Informal Supports for Long-Term Contracts: Domestic Investors' Home Court Advantage; Additional Contributions; Research Design; A Sector Focus on Urban Water and Sanitation; Nested, Subnational Comparisons; Sources; Road Map; 1 Informal Contractual Supports in Weak Institutional Environments; The Outcomes of Interest: Resilient versus Brittle Contractual Relationships; Bilateral Bargaining in a Volatile Political Setting |
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Explaining Divergent Contractual RelationshipsInvestor Organizational Structure and Divergent Contract Trajectories; Firm Structure, Preferences, and Negotiating Tactics; Investor Organizational Structure and Embeddedness; Investor Organizational Structure and Predicted Contract Trajectories; Variation among Foreign Investors; Political Sources of Variation; Financial Resources and Changing Leverage over Time; Scope Conditions for the Argument; Alternative Explanations; Conclusion; 2 Water and Sanitation Privatization in Argentina: An Overview |
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The Setting for Privatization: A Decentralized and Deficit-Ridden SystemA Relatively Uniform Privatization Program with Partial Uptake; The "Selection Process": Investor Entry into Particular Contracts; A Broad-Brush Test of the Book's Argument in the Argentine Water Sector; Choice and Measurement of the Key Dependent and Independent Variables; Conceptualizing and Measuring Investor Organizational Structure; Conceptualizing and Measuring Investor Exit; Measuring Successfully Concluded Contract Renegotiations; Conceptualizing and Measuring Post-Crisis Rate Increases |
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Correlations between Investor Organizational Structure and Contractual OutcomesAn Initial Consideration of Alternative Explanations; Conclusion; 3 Contractual Fragility Prior to the Crisis: Investors without Diverse Local Holdings Falter; Identifying More and Less Challenging Political Environments for Infrastructure Contracts; Expectations and Measurement for Contracts in High-Hurdle Political Environments during Periods of High Investor Leverage; Foreign-Led Contracts in Provinces with High Political Hurdles; Saur's Faltering Trajectory in Mendoza Province |
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The Implosion of Azurix's Contract in Buenos Aires ProvinceThe Collapse of the Aguas del Aconquija Contract in Tucumán; Domestic Investors with and without Local Holdings in High-Hurdle Environments: The Corrientes Case; Conclusion; Chapter Appendix; Political Hurdle Index; Details; 4 Smoother Sailing for All Investors in Less Competitive Provinces; Foreign-Led Contracts in Provinces with Low to Moderate Political Hurdles; Foreign Investor Suez's Portfolio in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Córdoba; A Smooth Start for the Foreign-Held Contract in Misiones Province |
| Summary |
This book argues that for infrastructure privatization programs, differences in firm organizational structure explain the viability of privatization contracts in weak institutional environments |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
English |
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Print version record |
| Subject |
Investments, Foreign -- Argentina
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Public works -- Argentina -- Finance
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Finance.
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Investments, Foreign
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Public works -- Finance
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Argentina
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781139865395 |
|
1139865390 |
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9781139871112 |
|
1139871110 |
|
9781107256569 |
|
1107256569 |
|
9781139863254 |
|
1139863258 |
|
1139699296 |
|
9781139699297 |
|
1139862340 |
|
9781139862349 |
|
1139861115 |
|
9781139861113 |
|
1139868969 |
|
9781139868969 |
|
