| Description |
xii, 306 pages : map ; 24 cm |
| Contents |
1. Propaganda in the Malayan Emergency: the missing dimension -- 2. The Malayan Communist Party and its impact on terrorist and rural Chinese confidence -- Central's intellectual and doctrinal problems -- The MCP, the masses and the tension between education and terror -- Admission of doctrinal mistakes: the October 1951 directives and the aftermath -- 3. Propaganda in disarray: the mistakes of the Gurney years, June 1948-May 1950 -- The disorganisation og government word-propaganda -- 4. Propaganda on the mend: the impact of Briggs and Greene, May 1950-February 1952 -- The propaganda impact of flawed resettlement -- Briggs, Greene and government propaganda of words -- Government psychological warfare and the terrorists -- 5. Propaganda turning point: Templer, February 1952-May 1954 -- The man, the plan, and the rural Chinese -- Operation service and the agents of government -- A.D.C. Peterson and the birth of 'information services' -- Government psychological warfare and terrorist confidence -- 6. Propaganda most optimal: Tunku Abdul Rahman and the collapse of the communist terrorist organisation, June 1954-December 1958 -- Government propaganda of words in the final phase -- Propaganda endgame: January 1955-December 1958 |
| Notes |
Formerly CIP. Uk |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 283-295) and index |
| Subject |
Propaganda, Anti-communist -- Malaya
|
|
Propaganda, British -- Malaya
|
| SUBJECT |
Malaysia -- History -- Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960.
http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85080083
|
| ISBN |
070071510X |
|
