Annotation This paper presents a dynamic game of strategic delegation between a principal and an agent. the principal can choose between two organizational designs: a traditional hierarchy where she retains authority over the choice of projects to be implemented or a delegation where she allows her agent to select the project. the key objectives of this model are to identify the long-run determinants of the principals choice and verify the impact of the authority allocation on the agents effort levels and on the principals payoffs. We apply the model to the relationships between institutional donors and nongovernmental organizations
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Cover title
"July 2003"--Caption
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 19-22)
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At head of title: IMF Institute
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