| Description |
1 online resource (x, 229 pages) |
| Contents |
Catching the contributory -- From holism to particularism -- Holism in the theory of value |
| Summary |
The first part discusses the nature of contributory reasons, set in the more general context of normative theory. he second part uses these results to argue for holism in the theory of reasons, and to construct an argument from that holism to particularism in ethics, which is characterised as the view that moral thought and judgement in no way depend on a suitable provision of moral principles. he third part is concerned with the theory of value, in particular with a form of holism there which is analogous to holism in the theory of reasons. There is a final chapter on holism in the theory of choice |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 216-224) and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Ethics.
|
|
Principle (Philosophy)
|
|
Ethics
|
|
ethics (philosophy)
|
|
PHILOSOPHY -- Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
|
|
Ethics.
|
|
Principle (Philosophy)
|
|
Particularisme.
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Oxford University Press
|
| ISBN |
0199270023 |
|
9780199270026 |
|
9780191533570 |
|
0191533572 |
|
9780191601729 |
|
0191601721 |
|
