Description |
1 online resource |
Contents |
Cover -- Career Behaviour and the European Parliament: All Roads Lead through Brussels? -- Copyright -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Abbreviations -- 1: Career Ambition in the European Parliament -- 1.1 The Importance of the Question -- 1.1.1 Why Study the European Parliament? -- 1.1.2 Careers as Endogenous Indicators of Institutional Change -- 1.2 Careers as Institutions -- 1.3 The Argument in Brief -- 1.4 ChapterOutline -- 2: An Institutional Theory for MEP Career Behaviour |
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2.1 Institutional Changes and Individual Action2.1.1 Careers as Institutions -- 2.1.2 How Institutions Change -- 2.1.3 A Theoretical View for MEP Career Behaviour -- 2.2 Legislative Professionalism and Career Ambition -- 2.3 Parties as Gatekeepers across Multiple Levels of Government -- 2.3.1 Candidate Selection and Recruitment -- 2.3.2 Party Organization across Multiple Levels of Government -- 2.4 Experience and Education: Internal Advancement within the EP -- 2.4.1 Individual Influence within the EP -- 2.4.2 Committee Report Allocation and Individual Control |
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2.4.3 The Rapporteur as Technician and Chief Negotiator2.5 Hypotheses -- 2.6 Research Design: Quantitative and Qualitative Applications -- Notes -- 3: Professionalization, Power, and Ambition -- 3.1 Legislative Power and Institutional Professionalization -- 3.1.1 Power and Prestige -- 3.1.2 Institutional Capacity and Professionalization -- 3.1.3 Changing Legislators, Changing Roles -- 3.1.4 Hypotheses -- 3.2 New Questions, New Data -- 3.3 Testing the Professionalization and Power Hypotheses -- 3.3.1 Dependent Variable -- 3.3.2 Independent Variables |
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3.3.3 Constructing the Model3.3.4 Results and Analysis -- 3.4 Towards a Broader View of MEP Career Advancement -- Notes -- 4: Federalism and Party Gatekeeping -- 4.1 Federalism, Decentralization, and Political Party Organization -- 4.1.1 Federalism and Decentralization -- 4.1.2 Connecting Subnational and Supranational Forms of Representation -- 4.1.3 Political Parties in Multi-Level Elections -- 4.2 A Multi-Level Theory for MEP Career Paths -- 4.2.1 Federalism and Career Specialists -- 4.2.2 Decentralization and the Centripetal Hypothesis |
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4.2.3 Hypotheses and Additional Explanations4.3 Testing the Effect of Federalism and Decentralization -- 4.3.1 Data and Coding Choices -- 4.3.2 Results and Analysis -- 4.3.3 Career Paths across Multiple Levels -- 4.4 Conclusions -- Notes -- 5: Rapporteur Selection and Internal Advancement -- 5.1 The Process of Committee Report Allocation -- 5.1.1 Rapporteurs as Ideological Moderates -- 5.1.2 Timing and Importance of Committee Reports -- 5.2 A Theory of Education and Experience -- 5.2.1 Specialization and Complexity in the European Parliament |
Summary |
This study presents an institutional theory for career behaviour in the European Parliament (EP). By focusing on the professional ambition of members of the EP (MEPs), the study presents a rigorous analysis of the powerful multinational legislature from within - problematising the link between institutional change and individual action, as evidenced in the career paths taken by MEPs. The study has implications for the nexus of institutional change and the behaviour of the political elite, broadly, as well as the study of representative democracy in the EU, specifically |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed June 9, 2015) |
Subject |
European Parliament.
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SUBJECT |
European Parliament fast |
Subject |
Politicians -- European Union countries
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Career development -- European Union countries
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LAW -- International.
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UE/CE Parlement.
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Parlementaires.
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Politiciens.
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UE/CE Etats membres.
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Career development
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Politicians
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Politics and government
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SUBJECT |
European Union countries -- Politics and government
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Subject |
European Union countries
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Form |
Electronic book
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ISBN |
9780191025730 |
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0191025739 |
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9780191784972 |
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0191784974 |
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