| Description |
1 online resource (xi, 186 pages) |
| Series |
Philosophy of mind series |
|
Philosophy of mind series.
|
| Contents |
Highlights of a difficult history -- The preliminary identification of our topic -- Approaches -- Bradley's protest -- James's disjunctive theory -- The source of Bradley's dissatisfaction -- Behaviourism and after -- Heirs of Bradley in the twentieth century -- The underlying metaphysical issue -- Explanatory tactics -- The basic distinction -- Metaphysical categories and taxonomies -- Adverbialism, multiple realizability, and natural kinds -- Adverbialism and levels of explanation -- Taxonomies and supervenience relations -- Rejecting the process : first view -- Supervenience-failure -- The modal commitments of the process : first view -- The interference argument : a putative problem for adverbialist accounts -- Cognitive unison -- The problem with attitude based adverbialism -- Gilbert Ryle and Alan White -- White's argument against disposition-based adverbialism -- The cognitive unison theory -- Tasks -- Cognitive processes -- Potential service of a task -- Superordinate tasks -- Some features of the theory -- Divided attention -- Degrees of attention and merely partial attention -- The causal life of attention -- Mental causation -- How to respond to mental causation objections -- The causal role of attention -- Attention as an enabling condition -- Counterfactuals -- The causal relevance of attention per se -- Counterfactuals and causally relevant properties -- Objections to counterfactual analysis of causation and of causal relevance -- The extrinsicness of unison -- The privative character of unison and the problem of absence causation -- Causal exclusion -- Consequences for cognitive psychology -- Psychology and metaphysics -- The metaphysical commitments of the process-identifying project -- The diverse explanatory construals of current psychological results -- Reasons for deflation -- Inductively unreliable properties -- Questions without answers -- The positive payoff -- Philosophical work for the theory of attention -- Putting attention to philosophical work -- Attention and reference -- Attention and consciousness -- Prospects for optimism |
| Summary |
Some psychological phenomena can be explained by identifying and describing the processes that constitute them. Others cannot be explained in that way. In this book, Christopher Mole gives a precise account of the metaphysical difference that divides these two categories |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 174-182) and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Attention.
|
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Philosophy of mind.
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Philosophy.
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Cognition.
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Attention
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Philosophy
|
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Mind-Body Relations, Metaphysical
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Cognition
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philosophy.
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cognition.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Mind & Body.
|
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Philosophy.
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Cognition.
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Attention.
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Philosophy of mind.
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
9780199781102 |
|
0199781109 |
|
9780199872817 |
|
0199872813 |
|
