| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
4: Not If but How: NAFTA and Extreme Over-Compliance in MexicoExternal Pressures, New Opportunities, and Changing Executive Preferences; Liberalization, NAFTA, and Pharmaceutical Patents; Completing the Rout: NAFTA, Business Politics, and the Expansive Coalition for Over-Compliance; Mobilization, Coalitions, and Patent Politics; Conclusion; 5: Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, and Executive Agency: From Reluctant Acquiescence to Enthusiastic Over-Compliance in Brazil; External Pressures, Legislative Activism, and Brazilś New Patent Law |
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Brazilian Over-Compliance in Comparative PerspectivePharmaceuticals, Biotechnology, and Political Coalitions; A Weak Pharmaceutical Sector in a Strong Defensive Coalition; External Pressures, Exporter Mobilization, and Executive Coalition Building; Conclusion; Part III: Modifying New Pharmaceutical Patent Systems; 6: The Defensive Coalition on the Offensive: National Industry and Argentinaś Market-Preserving Patent System; Patents, Adjustment, and the New Political Economy of Pharmaceuticals in Argentina; External Pressures and ARGENTINEAN Defiance, Again; Data Protection |
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Cover; Coalitions and Compliance: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents in Latin America; Copyright; Acknowledgments; Contents; Abbreviations; List of Figures and Tables; Part I: Context, Theory, Explanatory Framework; 1: Global Change, Political Coalitions, and National Responses; Harmonization, Differentiation, and Coalitional Politics; The Drivers of Compliance and Over-Compliance; Research Design, Data Sources, Methodology, and Organization; 2: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents; Intellectual Property, Patents, and Pharmaceutical Conflicts |
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Preliminary InjunctionsLocal Labs, Secondary Patents, and Patent Examination Guidelines; Pharmaceutical Producer Power and State Regulatory Capacity; Conclusion; 7: Whatś Good for Us is Good for You: The Transnational Pharmaceutical Sector and Mexicoś Internationalist Patent System; The Legacies of Early and Extreme Over-Compliance; Legislative Perversity: Reforming Mexicoś Compulsory Licensing Provisions; Extending Protection through the Courts; Unfulfilled Ambition: Introducing Pre-Grant ̀̀Opposition;́́ Conclusion |
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Two Periods of Conflict: The Key IssuesThe Political Economy of Introducing Pharmaceutical Patents; The Political Economy of Tailoring Pharmaceutical Patent Systems; Conclusion; Part II: Introducing PharmaceuticalPatents; 3: Power to the Producers: Industrial Legacies, Coalitional Expansion, and Minimalist Compliance in Argentina; External Pressures, Executive-Legislative Conflict, and Argentinaś New Patent Law; Power and Preferences in the Pharmaceutical Industry; CILFAś Coalition; Export Profile and CAEMEś Unsuccessful Political Mobilization; Conclusion |
| Summary |
Coalitions and Compliance examines how international changes can reconfigure domestic politics. Since the late 1980s, developing countries have been subject to intense pressures regarding intellectual property rights. These pressures have been exceptionally controversial in the area of pharmaceuticals. Historically, fearing the economic and social costs of providing private property rights over knowledge, developing countries did not allow drugs to be patented. Now they must do so, an obligation with significant implications for industrial development and public health. This book analyses different forms of compliance with this new imperative in Latin America, comparing the politics of pharmaceutical patenting in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Coalitions and Compliance focuses on two periods of patent politics: initial conflicts over how to introduce drug patents, and then subsequent conflicts over how these new patent systems function. In contrast to explanations of national policy choice based on external pressures, domestic institutions, or Presidents' ideological orientations, this book attributes cross-national and longitudinal variation to the ways that changing social structures constrain or enable political leaders' strategies to construct and sustain supportive coalitions. The analysis begins with assessment of the relative resources and capabilities of the transnational and national pharmaceutical sectors, and these rival actors' efforts to attract allies. Emphasis is placed on two ways that social structures are transformed so as to affect coalition-building possibilities: how exporters fearing the loss of preferential market access may be converted into allies of transnational drug firms, and differential patterns of adjustment among state and societal actors that are inspired by the introduction of new policies. It is within the changing structural conditions produced by these two processes that political leaders build coalitions in support of different forms of compliance |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Print version of record |
| Subject |
Pharmaceutical industry -- Latin America
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Patent laws and legislation -- Latin America
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Patents -- Latin America
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Industries -- General.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Exports & Imports.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- International -- General.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- International -- Marketing.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- International Relations -- Trade & Tariffs.
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Patents
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Patent laws and legislation
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Pharmaceutical industry
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Latin America
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| Genre/Form |
patents.
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Patents
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Patents.
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Brevets d'invention.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780191612275 |
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0191612278 |
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0199593906 |
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9780199593903 |
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9780191845574 |
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0191845574 |
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