Equilibrium party hegemony -- Structural determinants of mass support for the PRI -- Budget cycles under PRI hegemony -- The politics of vote buying -- Judging economic performance in hard times -- Ideological divisions in the opposition camp -- How voters choose and mass coordination dilemmas -- Electoral fraud and the game of electoral transitions -- Conclusion
Summary
"Most autocracies today hold elections. Yet the role of autocratic elections and the behavior of voters and parties in these regimes often appear puzzling. Through the use of simple formal theory, quantitative analysis, and historic narrative, this book develops a broadly comparative theory of the survival and demise of "electoral autocracies" and the strategies they use to resolve intraparty conflict, divide and deter elite opponents, and win political loyalty from the masses. The book illustrates the theory with an analysis of the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes of the twentieth century."--Jacket
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 273-289) and index
