| Description |
1 online resource (xiv, 195 pages) : illustrations |
| Contents |
Introduction and overview -- Development of occupational licensing as a labor market institution -- Quality and demand for occupational licensing -- Licensing, labor supply, and earnings -- State regulatory policies and the economy-wide impacts of licensing -- Comparing licensing in the United States and the European Union -- The emerging labor market institution of occupational licensing |
| Summary |
Annotation Dentists, Doctors, Lawyers, Fortune Tellers and Frog Farmers are now licensed occupations in either all or some U.S. states. The reasons given for the growth and benefits of this form of regulation usually states that existence of licenses may minimize consumer uncertainty over the quality of the licensed service and increase the overall demand for the service. Regulations that require a practitioner to be trained at a minimum level recognize a form of regulation which may produce positive social payoffs. Consumers often value the reduction in downside risk more than they value the benefits of a positive outcome. This preference by consumers of the status quo or reducing risk of a highly negative outcome has been called "loss aversion." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 169-180) and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Competition -- United States.
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Occupations -- Licenses -- United States.
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Professions -- Licenses -- United States.
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Quality assurance -- United States.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| LC no. |
2005028269 |
| ISBN |
0880992840 (paperback; alk. paper) |
|
0880992859 (hardcover ; alk. paper) |
|
1429454865 (electronic bk.) |
|
9780880992848 (paperback; alk. paper) |
|
9780880992855 (hardcover ; alk. paper) |
|
9781429454865 (electronic bk.) |
|
