| Description |
1 online resource |
| Series |
RAND Corporation monograph series |
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Rand Corporation monograph series.
|
| Contents |
Introduction -- Arguments for and against minimalist stabilization -- Overview of results of minimalist stabilization -- Case studies -- Conclusion -- Appendix A: Cases and coding notes |
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Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Background: Weak and Failed States and the Problem of Intervention; Weariness with Large-Scale Nation-Building; The Growing Consensus in Favor of Minimalist Stabilization; Moving Beyond the Current Debate; The Concept of Minimalist Stabilization; Approach; CHAPTER TWO: Arguments For and Against Minimalist Stabilization; Costs and Sustainability; Nationalist Backlashes and Golden Hours; Dependency, Adaptability, and Transformation; Control and Escalation |
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ConclusionCHAPTER THREE: Overview of the Results of Minimalist Stabilization; Analytic Framework; Empirical Scope of the Research; Military Outcomes: Defining Success; Stabilizing Interventions; Operational Environments; Empirical Results; Outcomes in the Absence of Intervention; Where Do States Intervene?; Consequences of Minimalist Stabilization; Understanding the Role of Operational Environments; Large Interventions; Conclusions; CHAPTER FOUR: Case Studies; El Salvador and the FMLN, 1979-1991; Conflict Narrative; Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment |
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Results of the U.S. InterventionConclusions; Colombia and the FARC, 1978 to the Present; Conflict Narrative; Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment; Conclusions; Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, 2002 to the Present; Conflict Narrative; Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment; Results of the U.S. Intervention; Conclusions; Central African Republic, 1996-1997; Conflict Narrative; Significant Characteristics of the Operational Environment; Conclusions; In Sum; CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion; The Value of Intervention; Improving the Probability of Success |
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Implications for U.S. Partnership StrategiesImplications for U.S. Defense Restructuring; APPENDIX: A. Cases and Coding Notes; Bibliography |
| Summary |
"The authors assess the utility and limitations of "minimalist stabilization"--Small-scale interventions designed to stabilize a partner government engaged in violent conflict. They propose policy recommendations concerning when minimalist stabilization missions may be appropriate and the strategies most likely to make such interventions successful, as well as the implications for U.S. Army force structure debates and partnership strategies. Minimalist stabilization missions do not significantly increase a partner government's odds of victory in a counterinsurgency campaign, but they do dramatically reduce the probability of defeat. Minimalist stabilization typically yields operational successes that degrade rebel capabilities and make it unlikely that the insurgents can topple the government. Such missions typically do not, however, alter the underlying structure of the conflict. They usually do not help foster significant political reforms in the partner government. Nor are they typically able to cut insurgents off from their resource bases. These dynamics suggest that the operational gains attributable to minimalist stabilization can usually be converted into strategic success only if the underlying political or international structure of the conflict can be altered. Military power plays a role, but the infrequency of victory suggests that the role of force is more about creating the framework within which a political process can operate successfully rather than winning per se. These findings do not yield simple policy prescriptions. These findings do, however, caution against viewing minimalist stabilization as a panacea. Modest resource commitments generally yield modest results. In some circumstances, such modest results will be adequate to secure important U.S. interests. In other cases they will not, and in some cases the under-resourcing of interventions may have catastrophic results."--Page 4 of cover |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
English |
|
Print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed |
| In |
Books at JSTOR: Open Access JSTOR |
| Subject |
Limited war -- Case studies
|
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Intervention (International law)
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Counterinsurgency -- Case studies
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Military assistance -- Case studies
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HISTORY -- Military -- Other.
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TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING -- Military Science.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Security (National & International)
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Counterinsurgency
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Intervention (International law)
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Limited war
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Military assistance
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| SUBJECT |
United States -- Armed Forces -- Stability operations -- Evaluation
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| Subject |
United States
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| Genre/Form |
Case studies
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Case studies.
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Études de cas.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Watts, Stephen (Stephen Baldwin)
|
| LC no. |
2012036806 |
| ISBN |
9780833076564 |
|
0833076566 |
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