| Description |
1 online resource (xi, 356 pages) |
| Contents |
Cover; Table of Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; PART ONE; 1. Aristotle on Ends; I.1. Human Life and Agency; I.2. Ends; I.2.1. Ends as Constraints; I.2.2. Ends, Reasons, and "For the Sake of Which"; I.3. The Aristotelian Framework; I.4. Unhelpful Friends; I.5. Scanlon; 2. Challenges to the Structure; II.1. No Ultimate End; II.2. Long-Chains Views; II.3. The Looping Model; II.4. The real challenge to the Aristotelian framework; II.5. Pseudo-pluralism; II.6. Political Pluralism; II.7. Telic Pluralism; II.8. What the Implausibility of Telic Pluralism Teaches Us; II.9. Relative Monism |
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3. Living WellIII. 1. Ancient Argument about Our Ultimate End; III. 2. Begin with Agency; III. 2.1. Subordinating Patiency; III. 3. First Nature; III. 4. Second Nature; III. 5. The VE Proposal; 4. Succeeding as Rational and Social Animals; IV. 1. The Contribution of Rationality; IV. 1.1. End-Setting; IV. 1.2. Judgment in Action; IV. 1.3. Training the Passions; IV. 2. Sociality; IV. 2.1. Sociality and Shared Ends; IV. 2.2. Caring for Others; IV. 2.3. The Agent-Relativity of Welfare and Care; IV. 2.4. Living Well in Community; IV. 3. Individual Difference; IV. 4. Autonomy; IV. 5. Objections |
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IV. 5.1. MisconceptionsIV. 5.2. Virtue's Commitments; PART TWO; 5. Constructivism; V.1. Motivation for the Approach; V.2. Taxonomy: Constructivism and Realism; V.3. Recognitionalism: Evidence For and Against; V.3.1. Rational Recognition; V.3.2. Reversal of Values and Conditional Value; V.3.2.1. RV and CV in Plato; V.3.2.2. RV and CV in the Stoics and Aristotle; V.3.2.3. Constructivism in Aristotle: The Doctrine of the Mean; V.3.3. RV Considered; V.3.4. The Constructed Value of Unconditional Goods; V.4. Practical Rationality, Agency, and Activity; V.4.1. Background: Realism |
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v. 4.2. Action GuidanceV. 4.3. The Failure of Recognitionalism; V.4.4. Naturalism; V.5. Particularism and Recognitionalism; 6. General and Particular; VI. 1. The Basic Argument; VI. 2. The Problem in Kant; VI. 2.1. The Problem in Korsgaard; VI. 2.2. The Problem in Herman; VI. 2.3. The Problem in O'Neill; VI. 3. The Upshot for Generalist Constructivism; VI. 4. Recognitionalist Particularism; 7. Fitting Judgment; VII. 1. First-Person, Third-Person; VII. 1.1. Case in Point; VII. 2. Constructivist Particularism-An Overview; VII. 3. Conditions of Judgment; VII. 4. Fittingness; VII. 4.1. The Fitting in Aristotle |
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VII. 4.2. The Fitting in Samuel ClarkeVII. 4.3. The Fitting in Later Theorists; VII. 5. Fittingness as a Normative Standard for Judgment; VII. 5.1. The Fittingness Relation; VII. 5.2. What Is Fitted to Conditions; VII. 5.3. Fittingness, the Good Life, and Comparability; VII. 5.4. Examples 203; 8. Critical Assessment; VIII. 1. Evaluation, Supervenience, and Justification; VIII. 1.1. The Nature of Supervenience in Detail; VIII. 1.2. Supervenience-Explanation; VIII. 1.3. Supervenience-Application; VIII. 2. Publicity; VIII. 3. The Relation between Standpoints; VIII. 4. Objectivity and Subjectivity; PART THREE |
| Summary |
In this text, Mark LeBar develops virtue eudaimonism, which brings the philosophy of the ancient Greeks to bear on contemporary problems in metaethics, especially the metaphysics of norms and the nature of practical rationality |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Conduct of life.
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Normativity (Ethics)
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Virtue.
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ethics (philosophical concept)
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PHILOSOPHY -- Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
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Conduct of life
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Normativity (Ethics)
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Virtue
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Meta-ethiek.
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Aristotelisme.
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Deugden.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
0199345716 |
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9780199345717 |
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9780199931125 |
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0199931127 |
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