| Description |
1 online resource (xiv, 229 pages) : illustrations |
| Series |
Representation and mind |
|
Representation and mind.
|
| Contents |
Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness. Preliminary remarks -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real-world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be. What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts. Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience. The existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple-contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Conclusion -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing. Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion. A closer look at the change-blindness hypotheses -- The "no-see-um" view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change-blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism. The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism |
| Summary |
We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? This book looks at this question and much more |
| Analysis |
PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General |
|
COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General |
| Notes |
"A Bradford book." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 217-225) and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Consciousness.
|
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Phenomenology.
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Materialism.
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phenomenology.
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materialism (philosophical movement)
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PSYCHOLOGY -- Personality.
|
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PHILOSOPHY -- Mind & Body.
|
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Consciousness
|
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Materialism
|
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Phenomenology
|
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Materialismus
|
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Bewusstsein
|
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Phänomenologie
|
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Empirie
|
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Erfahrung
|
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Physikalismus
|
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Filosofie van de geest.
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Bewustzijn.
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Materialisme.
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Fenomenologie.
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
9780262255172 |
|
0262255170 |
|
9780262261227 |
|
0262261227 |
|
1282240137 |
|
9781282240131 |
|
