| Description |
1 online resource (x, 163 pages) |
| Summary |
In this incisive new monograph one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, the author sheds new light on issues of crucial importance in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science |
| Analysis |
Epistemology |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL |
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digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL |
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Print version record |
| Subject |
Knowledge, Theory of.
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Belief and doubt.
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Philosophy of mind.
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Cognition.
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Cognition
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epistemology.
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cognition.
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Belief and doubt.
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Cognition.
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Knowledge, Theory of.
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Philosophy of mind.
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Cognitie.
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Meningen.
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Twijfel.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780191679179 |
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0191679178 |
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9780198236047 |
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0198236042 |
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