Description |
1 online resource (25 pages) : illustrations |
Series |
IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/02/183 |
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IMF working paper ; WP/02/183.
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Summary |
Does policy conditionality worsen domestic welfare, as governments are forced to attempt unpopular reforms resulting in damaging protests, or does conditionality help implement reforms that otherwise would have been impossible? This paper analyzes these questions. Using a game-theoretic framework, it argues that the impact of conditional aid on welfare is nonmonotonic. Sufficiently conditioned aid can enhance the signaling power of reform announcements, thereby deterring protest and enabling reform. In contrast, inadequately conditioned aid may induce a "weak" government to mistakenly attempt reform, resulting in protest and a worsening of domestic welfare relative to the status quo |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 24-25) |
Notes |
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL |
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English |
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digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL |
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Print version record |
Subject |
Conditionality (International relations) -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models
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Economic policy -- Econometric models
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Economic assistance -- Econometric models
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Loans, Foreign -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models
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Economic assistance -- Econometric models.
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Economic policy -- Econometric models.
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Form |
Electronic book
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Author |
International Monetary Fund.
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IMF Institute.
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ISBN |
1451904681 |
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9781451904680 |
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1462376088 |
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9781462376087 |
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1452756244 |
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9781452756240 |
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1282107089 |
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9781282107083 |
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9786613800435 |
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6613800430 |
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