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Book Cover
E-book
Author Ramcharan, Rodney

Title How does conditional aid (not) work? / Rodney Ramcharan
Published [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002

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Description 1 online resource (25 pages) : illustrations
Series IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/02/183
IMF working paper ; WP/02/183.
Summary Does policy conditionality worsen domestic welfare, as governments are forced to attempt unpopular reforms resulting in damaging protests, or does conditionality help implement reforms that otherwise would have been impossible? This paper analyzes these questions. Using a game-theoretic framework, it argues that the impact of conditional aid on welfare is nonmonotonic. Sufficiently conditioned aid can enhance the signaling power of reform announcements, thereby deterring protest and enabling reform. In contrast, inadequately conditioned aid may induce a "weak" government to mistakenly attempt reform, resulting in protest and a worsening of domestic welfare relative to the status quo
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 24-25)
Notes Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL
English
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL
Print version record
Subject Conditionality (International relations) -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models
Economic policy -- Econometric models
Economic assistance -- Econometric models
Loans, Foreign -- Economic aspects -- Econometric models
Economic assistance -- Econometric models.
Economic policy -- Econometric models.
Form Electronic book
Author International Monetary Fund.
IMF Institute.
ISBN 1451904681
9781451904680
1462376088
9781462376087
1452756244
9781452756240
1282107089
9781282107083
9786613800435
6613800430