Title The impact of corporate governance structures on the agency cost of debt / Jorge A. Chan Lau

Published [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001

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Description 1 online resource (12 pages) : illustrations Series IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/01/204 IMF working paper ; WP/01/204. Summary This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (page 12) Notes Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL English digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL Print version record Subject Corporate governance -- Econometric models Corporate debt -- Costs -- Econometric models Corporations -- Cost of operation -- Econometric models Industrial management -- Econometric models Bankruptcy -- Econometric models Bankruptcy -- Econometric models Corporate governance -- Econometric models Industrial management -- Econometric models Form Electronic book Author International Monetary Fund. International Capital Markets Department. ISBN 1282529331 9781282529335 9781451919080 1451919085 1462370853 9781462370856 1452701601 9781452701608 9786613821836 6613821837

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