Introduction -- Criminal law basics and the willful ignorance doctrine -- What is criminal culpability -- The scope of the willful ignorance doctrine (I) -- The scope of the willful ignorance doctrine (II) : the duty to reasonably inform oneself -- Toward a normative theory of equal culpability imputation -- Iterated reckless ignorance as a substitute for knowledge -- Substituting willful ignorance for purpose? -- Subwillful motivated ignorance -- Corporations keeping themselves in the dark -- Conclusion
Summary
The willful ignorance doctrine says defendants should sometimes be treated as if they know what they don't. This book provides a careful defense of this method of imputing mental states. Though the doctrine is only partly justified and requires reform, it also demonstrates that the criminal law needs more legal fictions of this kind. The resulting theory of when and why the criminal law can pretend we know what we don't has far-reaching implications for legal practice and reveals a pressing need for change
