| Description |
1 online resource (xv, 312 pages) |
| Series |
The law and public policy |
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Law and public policy.
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| Contents |
I. Defining the ground, and providing a psychological context for the emotions -- When the law's story of emotion and culpability is at odds with human nature -- Within a normative law, can psychology's place still be defended? -- Emotions in folk psychology -- Emotions in academic psychology: implications for culpability and the law -- The emotional palette -- II. Analyses and comparisons of the law's emotion and culpability theories -- Murder's incongruities: criminal law from civil law, malice and emotions denuded, and where intent matters not -- Manslaughter's failing theories of mitigation: emotions bound by objective rules, or an unrestrained subjectivity? -- Insanity I: the prototypic, yet problematic, excusing condition -- Insanity II: its disconnect, defect of reason, and incapacity -- Where self-defense's justification blurs into excuse: a defensible theory, with fitting verdicts, for mistaken self-defense -- III. Concluding thoughts: psychology's informing function -- Moving the law towards a coherent culpability story -- A reformulation, and concluding recommendations references |
| Summary |
"This book investigates why, when, and how ordinary human beings hold some individuals guilty of crimes, but others less so or not at all. Why, for example, do the emotions of the accused sometimes aggravate a murder, making it a heinous crime, whereas other emotions might mitigate that murder to manslaughter, excuse a killing ("by reason of insanity"), or even justify it ("by reason of self-defense")? And what emotions on the part of jurors come into play as they arrive at their decisions? The authors argue persuasively that U.S. law is out of touch with the way that jurors' "commonsense justice" works and the way they judge culpability. This disconnect has resulted in some inconsistent verdicts across different types of cases and thus has serious implications for whether the law will be respected and obeyed. Problems arise because criminal law has no unified theory of emotion and culpability, and legal scholars often seem to misunderstand or ignore what psychologists know about emotion. The authors skillfully show that the law's culpability theories are (and must be) psychological at heart, and they propose ways in which psychology can help inform and support the law. Throughout, the authors deftly weave examples from real-life high profile cases such as those of John Lee Malvo, Andrea Yates, and Bernard Goetz, as well as--unexpectedly--illuminating examples from the psychologically sophisticated tragedies of Shakespeare"--Jacket. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved) |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 265-284) and index |
| Notes |
English |
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Print version record |
| Subject |
Guilt (Law)
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Law -- Psychological aspects.
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Emotions (Philosophy)
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Guilt.
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Guilt
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guilt.
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Guilt
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Emotions (Philosophy)
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Guilt (Law)
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Law -- Psychological aspects
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Parrott, W. Gerrod
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