| Description |
1 online resource (x, 155 pages) : illustrations |
| Series |
Contributions to economics, 1431-1933 |
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Contributions to economics. 1431-1933
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| Contents |
Cover -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Setting the Stage -- 2.1 Revisiting Political Economy -- 2.1.1 Decision-Making Processes in Societal Systems -- 2.1.2 Rational Choice in Economic Systems -- 2.1.3 Rational Choice in Political Systems -- 2.2 Refreshing the Analysis of European Integration -- 2.3 Strands of Research in Exchange-Rate Policy -- 2.4 In Lieu of Results -- 3 The Core, the Crux, and the Costs Involved -- 3.1 The Core -- 3.2 The Crux -- 3.3 The Costs -- 4 Exchange-Rate Policies in CEECs -- 4.1 Brief Synopsis of Exchange-Rate Policies in CEECs -- 4.2 Governance Aspects of ERM II -- 4.3 Political Economy of Exchange-Rate Policy -- 4.4 Results -- 5 Game-Theoretic Analysis -- 5.1 Two-Stage Bargaining with Brinkmanship -- 5.2 Alternative Bargaining Solutions -- 5.2.1 Nash-Bargaining Solution -- 5.2.2 Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution -- 5.2.3 Ståhl-Rubinstein Solution -- 5.3 Results -- 6 Empirical Analysis -- 6.1 Estimations of Cost Parameters -- 6.1.1 Costs of Default -- 6.1.2 Costs of Convergence -- 6.2 Estimations of EU-Aversion -- 6.3 Computing the Probability for a Frugal EU -- 6.4 Monte-Carlo Simulation of Threat Game Bounds -- 6.5 Syncretism of Empirical Analysis -- 7 Conclusions -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Symbols -- References -- Last Page |
| Summary |
"This work examines the political economy of exchange-rate policies in the context of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone. The analysis shows that prospective members of the EMU are likely to pass on some of the incurred Maastricht costs of convergence to the current EMU-members. The transmission mechanism is an altered exchange-rate policy that is carried out utilizing a "threaten-thy-neighbour"--Strategy. The nature of the arising conflict between current and prospective EMU-members originates from both parties' admitted inclination to complete the enlargement process, complicated by their disinclination to bear the costs. The ensuing moral-hazard behaviour of the CEECs proves to be one of brinkmanship. The subsequent bargaining game results in a robust outcome most likely in terms of providing extra European funding. This may then ensure a stabilization of the CEECs' convergence toward the EMU, and a successful completion of eastward enlargement or the eurozone."--Jacket |
| Analysis |
economie |
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economics |
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bedrijfswetenschap |
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management science |
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economisch beleid |
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economic policy |
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integratie |
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integration |
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Europa |
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Europe |
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finance |
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speltheorie |
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game theory |
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wiskunde |
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mathematics |
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macroeconomics |
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Management studies, Business Administration, Organizational Science (General) |
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Economics (General) |
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Management, bedrijfskunde, organisatiekunde (algemeen) |
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Economie (algemeen) |
| Notes |
doctoral Freie Universität, Berlin 2004 |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 143-155) |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Foreign exchange rates -- Government policy -- Europe, Eastern
|
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Foreign exchange rates -- Government policy -- European Union countries
|
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Monetary policy -- Europe
|
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Economic stabilization -- Europe
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Foreign Exchange.
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Affaires.
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Stabilité économique.
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UE/CE Intégration.
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Taux de change.
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Science économique.
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Economie de l'entreprise.
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Economic stabilization
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Foreign exchange rates -- Government policy
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International economic integration
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Monetary policy
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Wisselkoersen.
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Monetaire politiek.
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EMU.
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Europese integratie.
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| SUBJECT |
European Union countries -- Economic integration
|
| Subject |
Europe
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Eastern Europe
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European Union countries
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| Genre/Form |
dissertations.
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Academic theses
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Academic theses.
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Thèses et écrits académiques.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9783790817621 |
|
3790817627 |
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9786610701315 |
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6610701318 |
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