Introduction -- Case study Malaya -- Case study Cyprus -- Conclusion and recommendations
Summary
The author examines the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. These two insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan Police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that are directly applicable to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine
Notes
Title from title screen (viewed May 24, 2006)
"March 2006."
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 48-54)
Notes
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