| Description |
1 online resource (viii, 208 pages) |
| Contents |
The Exclusion Thesis -- The Self-Consciousness Argument -- The Objectivity Argument -- The Concept Version of the Objectivity Argument -- Quasi-Memory -- Geometrical Self-Location -- The Intuition Version of the Objectivity Argument -- Awareness of the Self 'Qua Subject' -- Immunity to Error Through Misidentification -- The Incompatibility Objection -- Core-Self and Bodily Self -- The Dispensability Objection -- The Unity Argument -- Unity and Objectivity -- Transcendental Self-Consciousness -- Personal Self-Consciousness -- The Identity Argument -- The First Concept Version of the Identity Argument -- The Second Concept Version of the Identity Argument -- The Problem of Misconception -- The Intuition Version of the Identity Argument -- Objections to (D2) -- The Fifth Response and (D1) -- Kant and the Identity Argument -- The 'Logical' Identity of the 'I' -- Reductionism and the Exclusion Thesis -- Reductionism and the Objectivity Argument -- Reductionism and the Identity Argument -- Reductionism and the Unity of Consciousness |
| Summary |
Self and World is an exploration of the nature of self-awareness. Quassim Cassam challenges the widespread and influential view that we cannot be introspectively aware of ourselves as objects in the world. In opposition to the views of many empiricist and idealist philosophers, including Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein, he argues that the self is not systematically elusive from the perspective of self-consciousness, and that consciousness of our thoughts and experiences requires a sense of our thinking, experiencing selves as shaped, located, and solid physical objects in a world of such objects. Awareness of oneself as a physical object involves forms of bodily self-awareness whose importance has seldom been properly acknowledged in philosophical accounts of the self and self-awareness |
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The conception of self-awareness defended in this book helps to undermine the idealist thesis that the self does not belong to the world, and also the claim that the existence of subjects or persons is only a derivative feature of reality. In the final part of the book, Cassam argues that the existence of persons is a substantial fact about the world, and that it is not possible to give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 199-203) and index |
| Subject |
Self (Philosophy)
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Self-consciousness (Awareness)
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Self-perception.
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Self Concept
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Self-consciousness (Awareness)
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Self-perception
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Self (Philosophy)
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Identiteit.
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Geest.
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Zelfbewustzijn.
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Moi (philosophie)
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Connaissance de soi.
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Perception de soi.
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Conscience de soi.
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Psychologie du soi.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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