| Description |
1 online resource (40 pages) : illustrations, map, color portraits, color photographs |
| Contents |
Executive summary. -- Introduction. -- What would effective on-chip governance look like? -- Policies that on-ship governance mechanisms could enable. -- Technical underpinnings. -- Challenges for implementation. -- Implementation timelines. -- Recommendations. -- Limitations and conclusion. -- Appendix A: Glossary for AI compute. -- Appendix B: additional security considerations |
| Summary |
Broadly capable AI systems, built and deployed using specialized chips, are becoming an engine of economic growth and scientific progress. At the same time, these systems also could be used by irresponsible actors to enable mass surveillance, conduct cyberattacks, and design novel biological weapons. This makes securing and governing the supply chain for AI chips important for mitigating risks to U.S. national security. The unique challenges of AI governance and the opportunities afforded by modern security technologies suggest alternative approaches are both necessary and possible. What if policies concerning AI chips could be implemented directly on the chips themselves? What if updates to export regulations could be deployed through a simple software update, backed by secure hardware? This report introduces the concept of “on-chip governance mechanisms”: secure physical mechanisms built directly into chips or associated hardware that could provide a platform for adaptive governance |
| Notes |
"January 2024"--Cover |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 31-40) |
| Notes |
Description based on online resource; title from PDF cover page (CNAS, viewed January 15, 2024) |
| Subject |
Computer systems -- Risk management
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Microprocessors -- Risk management
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Integrated circuits -- Design and construction.
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Computer security.
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| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Fist, Tim, author
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Withers, Caleb, author
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Center for a New American Security, publisher.
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