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E-book
Author Niyato, Dusit, author.

Title Auction theory for computer networks / Dusit Niyato, Nguyen Cong Luong, Ping Wang, Zhu Han
Published Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2020
©2020

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Description 1 online resource (x, 279 pages) : illustrations
Contents Introduction page -- 1.1. A Brief Overview of the History of Auctions -- 1.2. Auction Theory in Computer Networks -- 1.3. Organization and Timeliness of This Book -- 1.3.1. Organization -- 1.3.2. Timeliness of the Book -- 1.4. Acknowledgments -- 2. Overview of Modern Computer Networks -- 2.1. Internet of Things -- 2.1.1. Definitions -- 2.1.2. IoT Architecture -- 2.1.3. Resources and Services of IoT -- 2.1.4. Wireless Sensor Network -- 2.1.5. Mobile Crowdsensing Network -- 2.2. Cloud Networking -- 2.2.1. General Architecture -- 2.2.2. Cloud Data Center Networking -- 2.2.3. Mobile Cloud Networking -- 2.2.4. Edge Computing -- 2.2.5. Cloud-Based Video-on-Demand System -- 2.3. 5G Wireless Networks -- 2.3.1. Massive Multiple-Input and Multiple-Output -- 2.3.2. Heterogeneous Networks -- 2.3.3. Millimeter Wave Communications -- 2.3.4. Cognitive Radio -- 2.3.5. Device-to-Device Communications -- 2.3.6. Machine-to-Machine Communications -- 2.4. Data Collection and Resource Management -- 2.4.1. Data Aggregation -- 2.4.2. Task Allocation -- 2.4.3. User Association -- 2.4.4. Interference Management -- 2.4.5. Wireless Caching -- 2.4.6. Mobile Data Offloading -- 2.5. Wireless Network Security -- 2.5.1. Users and Attackers in Wireless Networks -- 2.5.2. Eavesdropping Attack -- 2.5.3. Denial-of-Service Attack -- 2.5.4. Information Security Issues -- 2.5.5. Illegitimate Behaviors in Wireless Networks -- 2.6. Summary -- 3. Mechanism Design and Auction Theory in Computer Networks -- 3.1. Mechanism Design -- 3.1.1. Mechanism -- 3.1.2. Mechanism Design -- 3.1.3. Revelation Principle -- 3.1.4. Incentive Compatibility -- 3.1.5. Individual Rationality -- 3.1.6. Economic Efficiency and Budget Balance -- 3.2. Optimal Mechanisms -- 3.2.1. Social Surplus and Profit -- 3.2.2. Social Surplus Maximization Problem -- 3.2.3. Profit Maximization Problem -- 3.3. Auction Theory in Computer Networks -- 3.3.1. Auction Basics -- 3.3.2. Auction Theory for Computer Networks -- 3.3.3. Basic Terminology in Auction Theory -- 3.4. Summary -- 4. Open-Cry Auction -- 4.1. English Auction -- 4.1.1. English Auction Process -- 4.1.2. Equilibrium Strategies -- 4.2. Development of English Auction for Computer Networks -- 4.2.1. System Model and Problem Formulation -- 4.2.2. Walrasian Equilibrium -- 4.2.3. English Auction for Walrasian Equilibrium -- 4.3. Dutch Auction -- 4.3.1. Dutch Auction Process -- 4.3.2. Revenue Equivalence Theorem -- 4.3.3. Equilibrium in Dutch Auction -- 4.4. Development of Dutch Auction for Computer Networks -- 4.4.1. Prevention of Black Hole Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks -- 4.4.2. Relay Selection in the Internet of Things -- 4.4.3. Channel Allocation in 5G Heterogeneous Networks -- 4.5. English-Dutch Auction -- 4.6. Summary -- 5. First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction -- 5.1. Definition -- 5.2. Equilibrium -- 5.2.1. Strategic Analysis -- 5.2.2. Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium -- 5.3. First-Price Sealed-Bid Reverse Auction -- 5.4. Development of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction for Computer Networks -- 5.4.1. Incentive Mechanism for Data Aggregation -- 5.4.2. Market-Based Adaptive Task Allocation -- 5.4.3. Market-Based Relay Selection -- 5.4.4. Denial-of-Service Attack Prevention -- 5.5. Summary -- 6. Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction -- 6.1. Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction -- 6.1.1. Definition -- 6.1.2. Dominant Strategy and Nash Equilibrium -- 6.1.3. Second-Price Sealed-Bid Reverse Auction -- 6.1.4. Development of Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction for Computer Networks -- 6.2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auction -- 6.2.1. Definition -- 6.2.2. Description -- 6.2.3. Dominant Strategy -- 6.2.4. Examples -- 6.2.5. Virtues -- 6.2.6. Development of VCG Auction for Computer Networks -- 6.3. Summary -- 7. Combinatorial Auction -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Substitutable and Complementary Items -- 7.3. Single-Round Combinatorial Auction -- 7.3.1. Bidding Language -- 7.3.2. Winner Determination Problem -- 7.4. Iterative Combinatorial Auctions -- 7.4.1. Ascending Proxy Auction -- 7.4.2. Clock-Proxy Auction -- 7.5. Development of the Combinatorial Auction for Computer Networks -- 7.5.1. Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio -- 7.5.2. Virtualization of 5G Massive MIMO -- 7.5.3. Mobile Data Offloading in 5G HetNets -- 7.5.4. Resource Allocation in D2D Communication Underlying Cellular Networks -- 7.6. Summary -- 8. Double-Sided Auction -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. Single-Round Double Auction -- 8.2.1. Uniform Pricing Policy -- 8.2.2. Discriminatory Pricing Policy -- 8.3. Continuous Double Auction -- 8.4. Development of Double Auction for Computer Networks -- 8.4.1. Sensing Task Allocation in Participatory Sensing -- 8.4.2. Location Privacy in Participatory Sensing -- 8.4.3. Spectrum Allocation in Heterogeneous Networks -- 8.4.4. Cloud Resource Allocation in Edge Computing -- 8.5. Summary -- 9. Other Auctions -- 9.1. Ascending Clock Auction -- 9.1.1. Auction Process -- 9.1.2. Application of Ascending Clock Auction for Physical Layer Security -- 9.2. Share Auction -- 9.3. Online Auction -- 9.3.1. Basic Terminologies -- 9.3.2. Development of Online Auction for Cloud Resource Pooling -- 9.4. Waiting-Line Auction -- 9.5. Summary -- 10. Optimal Auction Using Machine Learning -- 10.1. Optimal Auction -- 10.2. Machine Learning -- 10.3. Machine Learning for Optimal Auction -- 10.3.1. Design -- 10.3.2. Example -- 10.4. Machine Learning for Myerson Auction -- 10.4.1. Design -- 10.4.2. Example -- 10.5. Summary
Summary "In this introductory chapter, we present an overview of the history of auctions. We then present critical issues and challenges of the current and future computer networks. Auctions can be used as elective tools to address the issues and challenges. We discuss motivations and signicance of the use of auctions in the computer networks. Finally, we present the objectives, organization, timeliness, and the potential audience of this book"-- Provided by publisher
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index
Notes Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on June 09, 2020)
Subject Auctions -- Mathematical models
Auctions -- Computer programs
Auction theory.
Wireless communication systems.
Auction theory
Auctions -- Mathematical models
Wireless communication systems
Form Electronic book
LC no. 2019056220
ISBN 9781108691079
1108691072