The common-pool problem is a central issue in the relationship between the political structure of jurisdictions and the size of public spending. Models predict that, other things being equal, greater political districting of a jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents new evidence on this and related predictions from a cross-section of city governments in The United States. The main findings is that one additional legislator is associated, on average, with 3 percent larger expenditures per capita. Evidence also suggests that forms of government with strong executives, particularly those with veto power, break the link between districting and government size
Notes
Cover title
"August 2001"--Page [1]
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 44-47)
Notes
English
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