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E-book
Author Eggertsson, Gauti B., author.

Title A political agency theory of central bank independence / Gauti Eggertsson and Eric Le Borgne
Published Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2003

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Description 1 online resource (44 pages)
Series IMF working paper ; WP/03/144
IMF working paper ; WP/03/144.
Summary We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not
Notes "July 2003."
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 43-44)
Notes At head of title: Research Dept., Research Department
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL
English
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL
Print version record
Subject Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models
Monetary policy -- Econometric models
Bank management -- Econometric models
Bank management -- Econometric models
Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models
Monetary policy -- Econometric models
Form Electronic book
Author Le Borgne, Eric, author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
ISBN 1282044338
9781282044333
9781451901610
1451901615
1462371078
9781462371075
1452792593
9781452792590
9786613797476
6613797472
1451856466
9781451856460