Description |
1 online resource (44 pages) |
Series |
IMF working paper ; WP/03/144 |
|
IMF working paper ; WP/03/144.
|
Summary |
We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not |
Notes |
"July 2003." |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 43-44) |
Notes |
At head of title: Research Dept., Research Department |
|
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL |
|
English |
|
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL |
|
Print version record |
Subject |
Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models
|
|
Monetary policy -- Econometric models
|
|
Bank management -- Econometric models
|
|
Bank management -- Econometric models
|
|
Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models
|
|
Monetary policy -- Econometric models
|
Form |
Electronic book
|
Author |
Le Borgne, Eric, author.
|
|
International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
|
ISBN |
1282044338 |
|
9781282044333 |
|
9781451901610 |
|
1451901615 |
|
1462371078 |
|
9781462371075 |
|
1452792593 |
|
9781452792590 |
|
9786613797476 |
|
6613797472 |
|
1451856466 |
|
9781451856460 |
|