pt. 1. A genealogy of "disproportionate response" -- Asymmetric warfare : a challenge for democracies -- The roots of a doctrine -- "Peace for Galilee," or, The making of a new insurgency -- How the IDF popularized the First Intifada -- pt. 2. The handling of the Second Intifada -- Botched engagement in the Intifada -- Tightening the screws -- The counter-productive virtuosity of targeted killings -- The resilience of Israeli democracy -- Strategic Inconsistencies -- Conclusion: "The only enemy that can defeat the IDF."
Summary
This book analyzes why and how the Israeli army did not succeed in finding the appropriate way to fight terrorism since the creation of the Israeli state
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index
Notes
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL
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