Presidents and executive term structure -- Introduction -- Becoming terminal: presidents operating in dual frames -- Research design and methodological overview -- Plan of the book -- Institutionalism: presidential behavior and the rule of law -- Developing a definitional framework -- Before and after the Twenty-Second Amendment: norms vs. institutions -- Executive term structure: an unexplored area of inquiry -- The term limit debate -- Choice in executive term structure: the political reality -- Conclusion -- The motivational structure of terminal presidents: what to expect and why -- Introduction -- Dual frames of reference -- The cycle of presidential periods -- Legacy agenda of presidents: domestic vs. foreign policy -- Conclusion -- Changing the status quo: the decree power of US presidents -- Introduction -- Proactive power and the initiative to decree -- Decree power in the United States -- Executive initiative vs. delegated authority: how the Court and Congress handle presidential decrees -- The collection and coding of US presidential decrees -- Conclusion -- Terminal logic behavior of US presidents -- The model: some expectations -- Data results -- Emergency power decrees: after the 1976 National Emergencies Act -- Emergency powers and terminal logic behavior -- Conclusion -- Decree power in Argentina and Brazil -- Introduction -- Term limits and decree power -- The changing constitutional boundaries of MPVs and DNUs -- How the Court and Congress handle MPVs and DNUs -- Conclusion -- Terminal logic behavior in Argentina and Brazil: a comparative look -- Introduction -- Using the case study method -- The effect of reforms on decree issuance: the evidence in brief -- Data and analysis: explaining trends of frequency -- Concluding remarks: moving beyond individual differences -- Anticipating the effects of terminal logic behavior: avenues of future inquiry -- Appendix. formal decree power as stipulated by Brazil's 1988 constitution -- Notes -- Bibliography
Summary
Presidents of nations with constitutionally imposed term limits are often viewed as growing weaker as they approach the end of their time in office. However, in this important new study, political scientist Genevieve M. Kehoe argues that because such chief executives are free from reelection constraint and often still enthusiastic to create a legacy by pursuing bold projects, they may accomplish significant initiatives. Kehoe has developed a concept for this which she calls "Terminal Logic Behavior" (TLB). Presidents and Terminal Logic Behavior: Term Limits and Executive Action in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina provides both case studies and quantitative evidence to show how US presidents of the last three decades have utilized decrees on foreign, domestic, and environment policy during their final months in office. She finds a systematic pattern of decree use consistent with the mark of TLB in a most unexpected place--presidents' use of national emergency powers. In a careful comparative analysis, she also finds support for her argument in the Argentinean and Brazilian experience of the same period.--Publisher description
